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I. INTRODUCTION
Many in the Ukrainfan Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR or
Ukraine),' as in other Soviet Republics and in Eastern Europe, no longer view
the traditional Soviet economic system as an adequate basis for a modern,
efficient, and prosperous economy.' They see the solution to wasteful resource
allocation, shortages of commodities, and general economic stagnation as lying
in the transformation of the basis of the Ukrainian economy from command
and control to market principles. In Ukraine, market principles continue to gain
official endorsement by various government bodies, despite increasingly
apparent hesitation at the Soviet All-Union level.' The economic transforma-
tion of a socialist economic system is a massive and unprecedented task,
carrying with it unforeseeable risks of social, economic, and political instabili-
ty. The position of the USSR as a nuclear superpower in the current world
order highlights the significance of such a transition.
This article examines one important aspect of economic transformation in
Ukraine - the process of privatization. It is the goal of this article to provide
1. Throughout this article, the Ukrainian Socialist Republic is referred to as "Ukraine," rather than
the conventional English usage of "the Ukraine" in deference to the strongly held preference of the
expatriate Ukrainian community in North America.
2. See, e.g., Conference Summary: Conference on Economic Reform in Ukraine (Ukrainian Research
Institute, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) (Nov. 13-15, 1990) (unpublished
report) [hereinafter Conference Summary]; PERESOIKA AND THE ECONOMY: NEW THINKING IN SOVIET
ECONOMICS (A. Jones & W. Moskoff eds. 1989) [hereinafter PERESTROIKA AND THE ECONOMY].
3. See, e.g., Opposition Leader Assesses Situation in Ukraine and Soviet Union, 1 UKRAINIAN BUS.
DIG., Feb. 22, 1991, at 9 [hereinafter Yukinovskii Interview].
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information and advice about the process by which Ukrainians could, them-
selves, formulate and implement a program of privatization. It does not pretend
to provide a substantive blueprint to guide Ukrainians in changing their econo-
my and society. It is for Ukrainians to think through their own economic and
social aims, and to formulate and implement their own policies. Ukrainians
should feel able to exercise such a right of economic self-determination against
the advice of western experts just as strongly as many Ukrainians now feel
they can exercise rights against the Soviet center.4
Ukrainians are acutely aware of the severe lack of Soviet experience with
and theories about market principles. As a result, they turn to the West for
help.' Western expertise, information, and advice regarding economic reform
can be very useful. Western economic principles provide a basic tool kit of
concepts and a distinctive method of reasoning that can yield important insights
into the nature of human economic behavior and contribute positive analyses
of policy proposals. Yet that is not, by itself, sufficient to advance economic
reform. Economists are not as good at examining issues of implementation,
such as the speed and sequencing of reforms during a fundamental economic
transformation.' More importantly, economics cannot provide the value
judgments necessary to arrive at normative proposals.'
The analysis of privatization in this article demonstrates why Ukrainian
economic self-determination is so important. Privatization would be inherently
associated with massive and unpredictable economic and social consequences
in Ukraine. Because of the continuing democratization of Ukrainian politics,
such consequences would fundamentally constrain the shape of Ukrainian
reform that could feasibly be implemented. "[Tlhe imperatives of political
sustainability may dominate the analysis of the reform process."' The process
of democratization in Ukraine, as in the USSR generally, is crucially interrelat-
4. See, e.g., The Declaration of Sovereignty by Ukraine, Pravda, July 17, 1990, English summary
reprinted in CuRRENT DIG. SOVIEr PREsS, Aug. 29, 1990, at 8. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying
text.
5. One example is the Project on Economic Reform in Ukraine (PERU), based in Kiev, Ukraine, and
at the Ukrainian Research Institute, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. PERU
is a cooperative effort to bring together western experts and Ukrainian policymakers to study, design, and
implement economic change in Ukraine. See Project on Economic Reform in Ukraine, Reform Update (Feb.
1, 1991) (unpublished report).
6. Hewett, Economic Reform in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China: The Politics of Economics,
79 AM. ECON. REv. 16, 18 (1989).
7. See Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 815 (1990) (providing a
thoughtful treatment of this subject). See also Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46
U. Cml. L. REV. 281, 287 (1979) ("[l1n measuring economic costs and benefits, the economist qua
economist is not engaged in the separate task of telling policymakers how much weight to assign to
economic factors," although his own analysis often seems to conflict with this). Regarding the inherent
existence of positive and normative qualities in two different schools of law and economics, see Rose-
Ackerman, Law and Economics: Paradigm, Politics or Philosophy, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 233 (N.
Mercuro ed. 1989).
8. S. FISCHER & A. GELB, ISSUES IN SOCIALIST ECONOMY REFORM 38 (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Department of Economics Working Paper No. 567, 1990).
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ed with economic reform.9 The ideals of individualism and freedom link the
pursuit of each goal. Pursuit of one goal individually, however, complicates
and could defeat the achievement of the other. Economic reform and democra-
tization accelerate and decelerate in much the same way as two participants
in a three-legged race. If both are to succeed, the design of a program of eco-
nomic reform, including privatization, must be guided by the likely Ukrainian
political consequences. In addition, large-scale privatization in Ukraine would
involve the most fundamental legal restructuring of existing property relation-
ships of any aspect of economic transformation. Since reform must be imple-
mented primarily through law, this article examines the nature and characteris-
tics of the existing Ukrainian legal system.
It is vital to understand the political, social, economic, and legal context
of Ukraine to determine the optimal shape of a program of privatization.
Informed Ukrainians should use western advice in pursuing the goals of
Ukrainian society. The Ukrainians, who understand the Ukrainian context and
who will have to deal with the consequences of their decisions, should ulti-
mately determine the nature of economic transformation in Ukraine. This
article is designed to facilitate the process of Ukrainian economic self-determi-
nation. Following Part H, which provides background information about
Ukraine, Part III illustrates the theory of, and international experience with,
privatization. Part IV identifies and analyzes options for a substantive program
of privatization in Ukraine and, in so doing, demonstrates a process for
formulating a program of privatization. Part V emphasizes the importance of
careful attention to the process by which a privatization program is implement-
ed.
H. UKRANE
In order to understand the political, economic, and legal issues of economic
reform in Ukraine, one must be aware of the separate, national identity that
is part of the Ukrainian consciousness. Ukraine has its own language, ° reli-
9. See, e.g., Gomulka, Gorbachev's Economic Reforms in the Context of the Soviet Political System,
in ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE SOCIALIST WORLD 67-74 (S. Gomulka, Y.-C. Ha & C.-O. Kim eds. 1989);
Palterovich, Competition and Democratization, in PERESTROIKA AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 60.
See generally A. Przeworski, Political Dynamics of Economic Reforms (Nov. 10, 1990) (unpublished manu-
script) (drawing on South America and Eastern Europe); Shelley, Democratization andLaw, in THE IMPACT
OF PERESTROIKA ON SoVIET LAW (A. Schmidt ed. 1990) (drawing same conclusion from legal perspective);
J. BATf, ECONOMIC REFORM AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE: A COMPARISON OF THE
CZECHOsLOVAK AND HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCES 281 (1988). While a full analysis of the theoretical and
empirical relationship between economic transformation and democratization is beyond the scope of this
article, aspects of the relationship are important in the article's analysis of privatization.
10. Ukrainian is the second most widespread Slavic language after Russian and was declared the
official state language of the Ukrainian SSR in 1989. Ukrainian Research Institute, Ukraine and the
Ukrainian People, in Background Reading Material: Conference on Economic Reform in Ukraine (Ukraini-
an Research Institute, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) (Nov. 13-15, 1990)
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gion, n time zone,12 and representation in the United Nations.13 The Ukrai-
nian SSR is the second largest of the fifteen republics of the USSR in terms
of its land area, its population, 4 and its economic significance. Its people are
urbanized, educated, and predominantly of Ukrainian nationality. The capital,
Kiev, is a beautiful and historic city of 2.6 million people. Ukraine borders
four Eastern European nations, three Soviet republics, and the Black Sea."
Ukrainian citizens are deeply conscious of their European-oriented history and
of the richness of Ukraine's natural resources.16
A. Politics and Nationalism
Although Ukraine has been a core, influential unit of the Russian Empire
and the Soviet Union since the late eighteenth century, it has historically
exhibited a vigorous sense of its own national identity. 7 Kiev was the center
of the powerful Kievan-Rus' empire of Ukrainian Slavs from the ninth century
until the Mongol invasions of the thirteen century. Ukraine again formed an
independent state in the mid-seventeenth century. There was a resurgence
of Ukrainian national self-assertiveness in the nineteenth century, which was
again prominent during both the formative period of the Soviet Union and
(unpublished collection) [hereinafter Background Reading Material].
11. Ukrainians were converted to Christianity in 988 and split between the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church (Greek-Catholic or Uniate) in 1596. Both were
recently legalized again after attempts at forced assimilation into the Russian Orthodox Church, the
Ukrainian branch of renamed itself the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Yukhnovskii Interview, su-
pra note 3, at 8; Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Catholic Church in Gorbachev's USSR, PROBs. OF COMMU-
NISM, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 1.
12. This became effective on July 1, 1990, seemingly as a gesture of independence by the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet. Aeroflot, a federally-managed airline, however, continued to run according to Moscow
time even in Ukraine. On Kiev Time, Izvestiya, June 13, 1990, at 4, English summary reprinted in 42
CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, July 18, 1990, at 24.
13. This was agreed to by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt in 1944 and sanctioned at the Yalta
Conference early in 1945 as the price of Soviet participation in the United Nations. T. Kis, NATIONHOOD,
STATEHOOD AND THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR/UKRAINE 1, 82 app. (1989).
14. Ukraine's population is 52 million. GOSUDAISTVENNII KOMrrET SSSR Po STATISTIKYE, SSSR
V TSIFRACH V 1989 GODU 36 (1990); it is comparable in size and population to France.
15. The bordering countries and republics are: the Polish Republic, the Czech and Slovak Federated
Republic [hereinafter Czechoslovakia], the Hungarian Republic, Romania, the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Moldavian Soviet Socialist
Republic.
16. Many Europeans, as well as Ukrainians, have historically regarded Ukraine as the bread basket
of Eastern Europe. Several recent Ukrainian papers have attempted to show that Ukraine is a European
country given its economic potential, making favorable comparisons with Germany, France, and Italy with
respect to per capita production of key industrial and agricultural products. See 1 UKRAINIAN BUS. DIG.,
Mar. 28, 1991, at 5.
17. See N. FR.-CHRovsKY, ANINTRODUCTIONTO UKRAwNIANHISTORY (vol. 1, 1981) (vol. 2, 1984)
(vol. 3, 1986); Pritsak, Kiev andAll ofRus': The Fate ofa Sacral Idea, 10 HARv. UKRAwNAN STUD. 279
(1986).
18. 1 N. FR.-CHItOVsKI, supra note 17, at 105-84; 2 N. FR.-CaIROVSKI, supra note 17, at 169-225;
0. SuBTELNY, UKRArM: A HISTORY 19-200 (1988).
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World War I.9 In the late 1950s and 1960s, Ukrainian nationalism gained
momentum as a popular dissident movement until a crackdown by the Soviet
authorities in the 1970s.2 °
Since the mid-1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev's All-Union Soviet government
has pursued a policy of perestroika, or "restructuring," that has affected
virtually every sphere of Soviet life: economic, social, political, legal, and
cultural.21 The amalgam of approaches under the general heading of pere-
stroika includes: democratization and the development of pluralist politics;
glasnost, or "openness," which has significantly liberalized state restrictions
on information, discussion, and criticism in public and in the media; and
khozraschet, which has involved decentralization of economic accountability
within the state economic system and liberalization of private economic
freedom.'
Perestroika has allowed Ukrainian nationalism to reemerge, fueled by such
events as the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear catastrophe, the current economic
decline, the collapse of socialist Eastern Europe, and the celebration of the
Millennium of Ukrainian Christianity.' Nationalism has now become an
intense driving force in the Ukrainian political debate, as it is in some other
Soviet Republics.24 It springs from a deeply felt, historically rooted desire
that Ukrainians should govern Ukraine. It has serious implications for the
future existence of the USSR because "[w]ithout Ukraine, something is torn
from the heart of the Soviet Union."' The nature of the debates, and their
potential effects both on Ukraine and the whole USSR, are similar, although
larger in scale, to the constitutional debates in Canada over the status of
Qu6bec.26
19. Duncan, Ukrainians, in THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION IN THE SOVIEt UNION 95, 96-97 (G. Smith
ed. 1990); 0. SUBTELNY, supra note 18, at 201-572.
20. Duncan, supra note 19, at 97-99; Solchanyk, Ukraine, Byelorussian, and Moldavia: Imperial
Integration, Russification, and the StruggleforNationalSurvival, in THE NATIONALmrES FACTOR IN SOVIET
PoLmcs AND SOCIETY 175, 176-79, 194-96 (L. Hajda & M. Beissinger eds. 1990).
21. See Campbell, Howto Thinkabout Perestroika, in SOCIALISM, PER S2ROJICA, AND THE DILEMMAS
OF SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM 1, 1-2 (J. Tedstrom ed. 1990) [hereinafter DLEMAS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC
REFORM]. In Ukrainian, perestroika translates as perebudova and glasnost as hiasnist. See Bohayevsky,
Some Aspects of Perebudova and Hlasnist in the USSR and in Soviet Ukraine, in ECHOES OF GLASNOST
IN SoVIET UKRAINE 12 (R. Bahry ed. 1989). This article employs the more familiar Russian terms.
22. See, e.g., D. LANE, SOVIET SOCIETY UNDER PERESTROIKA 13-17, chs. 2-4, 9 (1990); Cohen,
Introduction: Gorbachev and the Soviet Reformation, in VOICES OF GLASNOST: INTERVIEWS WITH
GORBACHEV'S REFORMERS 15-16 (S. Cohen & K. Heuvel eds. 1989).
23. Duncan, supra note 19, at 100-07; Solchanyk, supra note 20, at 185-86, 197-98. The Chornobyl
disaster, just north of Kiev, was a particularly important catalyst for popular mobilization. See also,
Onyshkevych, Echoes of Glasnost: Chornobyl in Soviet Ukrainian Literature, in ECHOES OF GLASNOST
IN SOVIET UKRAINE, supra note 21, at 151; Marples, NuclearPower, Ecology and the Patriotic Opposition
in the Ukrainian SSR: An Analysis of a Post-Chornobyl Trend, in id. at 18.
24. See generally, THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION IN THE SOVIET UNION, supra note 19; S. KuX,
SOVIET FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ch. 3 (1990).
25. G. HOSKiNG, THE AwAKENING OF THE SoviET UNION 93 (1990).
26. Constitutional Committee of the Qudbec Liberal Party, A Qudbec Free to Choose (Jan. 28, 1991).
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The democratization of Soviet politics under perestroika has enabled and
legitimated the public expression of radical Ukrainian views. A coalition of
opposition democratic groups and parties called Rukh, the popular movement
of Ukraine, won a significant presence in the nascently democratic Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet in 1990.27 The views of the people and groups within Rukh
are varied, ranging from moderate to an extreme that might be considered
treasonous in western societies. The major concern for most members centers
on the promotion of democratization and glasnost and on support for the
development of Ukrainian culture and language.28 Economic concerns are
significant but, at least in the initial stages of the movement, secondary. 29
There is ample evidence of continuing Ukrainian popular support for Rukh
and its objectives. The pressure by Rukh has, tellingly, yielded remarkable
concessions from the communist government. Rukh members hold chairs in
seven of the twenty-three Commissions of the Supreme Soviet, including the
chair of Economic Reform and Economic Management.3" On July 16, 1990,
the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet voted 355 to 4 in support of a Declaration of
Sovereignty. 1 The Declaration provides that Ukrainians have the exclusive
right to possess, use, and dispose of Ukraine's national wealth. It also pro-
claims Ukraine's right to have its own internal troops, and its intention to
become a nonnuclear state.32 In October 1990, 300 student hunger-strikers
camped outside the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet for fifteen days; their strike was
supported by other strikes and demonstrations. 3 The conflict was resolved
when the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decided that the Prime Minister would
resign, Ukrainians would perform regular military service outside the Ukraine
27. Rukh includes the two largest non-communist and anti-communist organizations - the People's
Party and the Democratic Party - as well as the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Democratic Center, the
.greens," and the Memorial Society. After the March 1990 election, the Communist Party held only 239
of the 450 seats in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. 1 UKRAINUAN Bus. DIG., Dec. 15, 1990, at 7, 12. See
Kuzio, Unofficial Groups and Semi-Official Groups and Samizdat Publications in Ukraine, in ECHOES OF
GLASNOST IN SOVIET UK1.AINE, supra note 21, at 66 (providing an overview of dissident groups); see also
Kuzio, Inaugural Congress of the Ukrainian Popular Front (Rukh) in Kiev, in id. at 102.
28. In a survey at the founding Rukh conference in September 1989, 75% and 73% of members chose
these as their goals. See Paniotto, The Ukrainian MovementforPerestroika- "Rukh. A Sociological Survey,
43 SoviET StuD. 177, 178 (1991).
29. Forty-six percent of Rukh members at the founding conference chose as their goal the promotion
of economic sovereignty within the framework of the USSR. The same percentage chose to work toward
the solution of pressing economic problems. Id. at 178.
30. That chair is held by Volodymyr Pylypchuk, who participated in the Conference on Economic
Reform in Ukraine. Conference Summary, supra note 2.
31. 1 UKRAINIAN Bus. DIG., Dec. 15, 1990, at 7, 12.
32. Declaration of Sovereignty, Pravda, July 17, 1990, at 8, English summary reprinted in 42
CutRENT DIG. SoviEt PRESs, Aug. 29, 1990, at 8.
33. Tsikora, Students End Hunger Strike. Studies Are Resumed, Izvestiya, Oct. 18, 1990, at 2, English
translation reprinted in 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 14, 1990, at 17.
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only on a voluntary basis, and that the Ukrainian SSR Constitution would be
brought into conformity with the Declaration of Sovereignty. 4
In a referendum of March 17, 1991, a large majority of Ukrainians voted
in support of only qualified membership in a Union of Soviet sovereign states.
A large majority in the three regions in Western Ukraine where the question
was asked, supported full independence. 5 On the same occasion, however,
a majority of Ukrainians approved the All-Union alternative put forth by
Gorbachev in his efforts to retain some central federal power. 6 These votes
illustrate the complicated contradictions and conflicts within Ukraine and the
USSR overperestroika in general. While an unforeseen momentum for change
has been strongly built up over the last six years, its aims and attitudes are
often vague, contradictory, and heavily influenced by the communist rhetoric
and ideology of the past. For instance, private economic activity is now
formally sanctioned but still ideologically alien. 7 Some Soviet surveys indi-
cate that those people who believe that the country needs private ownership
of land and enterprises outnumber those who have a positive attitude toward
private property. Other research suggests that popular attitudes toward free
markets in the USSR and the United States are surprisingly similar in their
ignorance and acceptance of the concepts, characteristics, and results of market
activity.
3 9
Communist Party officials and the bureaucracy at all levels strongly resist
moves that threaten their personal or ideological interests. This impacts
particularly on economic matters where party apparatchiki and nomenklatura
34. Id. In January 1991, some of these student activists were prosecuted for their occupation of a
university building. Tsikora, Prosecutor's OfficeProsecutes Students, Izvestiya, Jan. 15, 1991, at3, English
translation reprinted in 43 CuRRENT DIG. SoVIET PRESS, Feb. 13, 1991, at 27.
35. Of those eligible, 80.2% of Ukrainians voted, and of that percent 80.2% of the voters (and 44%
of those in Kiev) supported Ukrainian membership of this Union of Soviet Sovereign States, rather than
"Socialist States," on the basis of the Declaration of Sovereignty. Over 85% of the population in three
strongly nationalistic regions of Western Ukraine voted for Ukraine to be an independent state. 1 UKRAINI-
AN Bus. DIG., Mar. 28, 1991, at 4.
36. Gorbachev's question ofsupport for the USSR as a renewed federation ofsovereign republics with
equal rights, guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of individuals, received support from 70.5% of
Ukrainians. Id.
37. Roucek, Private Enterprise in Soviet Political Debates, 40 SOVIET STuD. 46, 47 (1988).
38. Aage, Popular Attitudes and Perestroika, 43 SoViET STUD. 3, 16 (1991). See also A. ASLUND,
GORBACHEV'S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM: THE SOVIET REFORM PROCESS, 1985-88, at 172 (1989)
(other surveys revealing significant generational differences in attitudes toward private enterprise and
cooperatives, with those under 45 and those over 75 being most in favor of cooperatives).
39. R. SHmLLER, M. BOYCKO & V. KoRoBov, POPULAR ATTrruDEs TOwARDS FREE MARKETS: THi
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES COMPARED (1990) [hereinafter R. SHILLER]. This research found
little difference between Moscow and New York regarding: attitudes toward income inequality; willingness
to impose policies of rationing rather than market clearing; belief in the importance of providing material
incentives for hard work; willingness to provide venture capital; reasons for saving; and fears of potential
government interference with their savings. Soviets were found to be less likely to accept exchange of
money as a solution to personal problems and to have less warm attitudes toward business success. But
Americans were found to be more of the opinion that speculators may cause economic problems and more




have wielded power for years and have developed sophisticated habits of
pursuing their self-interest.' Gorbachev has identified bureaucrats as the most
obdurate opponents of economic restructuring.41 Political and bureaucratic
factors "between them suffice to explain the main contours of the [economic]
reform cycle, from the recognition of the problem, on through the design and
implementation of the reforms to the retrenchment. " 42
Nationalism and the political rhetoric and strategies that concern economic
transformation often influence each other.43 The nationality problem has
become "entwined with, and indeed has become a metaphor for, all the major
issues of reform."I For example, in September 1990, a union-wide working
group on the formulation of a new union treaty found, after preliminary
consultations, that all Republics unanimously agreed that preparation of a new
union treaty should proceed simultaneously with the transition to a market
economy.4' Nationalism also has direct implications for the nature of eco-
nomic reform, as demonstrated by the heightened fear in the Ukraine of
exploitative foreign economic activity, regardless of country or region of
origin. This typifies the fundamental interrelationships between economic
transformation and politics in Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalism, sovereign
capacity, public confusion and prejudices, and party and bureaucratic entrench-
ment all affect the nature of economic reform in Ukraine.
B. Economics
The principle of command and control forms the fundamental basis for the
traditional economic system in the Soviet Union.' Following Marxist ideolo-
gy, almost all economic production, distribution, and exchange has been under
both federal and republic ownership and control. A network of government
planning agencies such as Gosplan (the State Planning Committee), government
industrial ministries, and government productive enterprises developed, result-
ing in a complicated system of plans and directives to organize almost all
40. The nomenklatura are people occupying key bureaucratic positions that must be formally appointed
by the Communist Party. See P. GREGORY, STRUCTrRING THE SOVIET ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY 3
(1990). Apparatchiki occupy responsible positions in the bureaucracy but bear little responsibility for final
results. Id. at 71. An apparatchik may be part of the nomenkiatura.
41. Colton, Approaches to the Politics of Systemic Economic Reform in the Soviet Union, 3 SOVIET
ECON. 145, 158-59 (1987).
42. Hewett, supra note 6, at 18.
43. See generally Conference Summary, supra note 2 (comments by participants in conference on
economic reform in Ukraine).
44. Lapidus, Gorbachev and the 'National Question : Restructuring the Soviet Federation, 5 SOvIET
ECON. 201, 247 (1989).
45. Stepovoi, Searching for a Formula for a Union Treaty, Izvestiya, Sept. 6, 1990, at 2, English
excerpts reprinted in 42 CutRRENT DIG. SOVmT PREsS, Oct. 10, 1990, at 1.
46. See generally P. GREGORY & R. STUART, SOVIET ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AN) PERFORMANCE
(4th ed. 1990).
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economic activity.47 Intermediate and final prices, and quantities of all prod-
ucts were set by this government apparatus. Industries were often deliberately
structured as monopolies4 or in groups of scientific-production associa-
tions.49 Only at the consumer level have enterprises been able to choose what
to buy without state direction. Market prices have had no role in facilitating
efficiency; the resulting resource allocation has not reflected the forces of
supply and demand. Consequently shortages, waste, and technological obsoles-
cence have often resulted in, and encouraged the development of, an informal,
illegal, second economy with interconnecting networks throughout the bureau-
cratic and political hierarchies.5" According to western economic theory, the
Soviet economic system can be expected to be inefficient in production,
allocation, and dynamic adjustment. 5' However, the Soviet government was,
for a time, able to shield its citizens from economic vicissitudes by manipulat-
ing prices and employment.
Presently, the traditional planned Soviet economy based on command and
control has broken down, whether as a result of the intolerable demands that
a complex economy inherently places on Soviet planners, or as a result of the
erosion of centralized, hierarchical authority that has accompanied the policies
of glasnost and perestroika. The system of authority once used by All-Union
ministries to control economic activity throughout the republics is ceasing to
function as the Soviet economy becomes regionalized and paralyzed.5" Ukrai-
nian citizens have been facing shortages of consumer goods at official prices,
notably food,53 and have experienced rising real prices, wasteful and pointless
resource allocation, environmental hazards, growing underemployment and
unemployment, and growing inequalities of wealth and income. Not surprising-
ly, these problems are accompanied by increasing social tension, manifested
especially in the emergence of crime and violence.54 Such trends stand in
sharp relief against the rhetoric of Marxist communism in which all Ukrainians
have been socialized, thus exacerbating their political impact and the Ukrainian
47. Id. at 18-23; see also D. LANE, supra note 22, at 27-37.
48. In 1990, the All-Union State Committee on Statistics examined 600 categories of manufactured
goods and found that half of the output came from a single factory in 219 cases, and all of the output from
a single factory in 215 other cases. Five examples of products produced by monopolies located in the
Ukraine are agricultural sowers, bicycles, color film, hoisting machines for mines, and steam driven piston
pumps. Bus. USSR, Jan. 1991, at 64-65.
49. Schroeder, Organizations and Hierarchies: The Perennial Search for Solutions, 29 COMP. ECON.
STD. 7, 16 (1987).
50. Grossman, The Second Economy: Boon or Bane for the Reform of the First Economy?, in
ECONOMIC REFoRMs IN TnE SociAuisT WORLD, supra note 9, at 79, 81.
51. See, e.g., Moore, Agency Costs, Technological Change, and Soviet Central Planning, 24 J.L.
& ECON. 189, 191 (1981).
52. S. Kux, supra note 24, at 51-52.
53. See Noren, The Soviet Economic Crisis: Another Perspective, 6 SOVIET ECON. 3, 20 (1990)
(regular food availability in Ukraine and Moldavia declined from 40% in 1987 to 23.6% in 1989).
54. See, e.g., Chirovsky, The Soviet Economy and Perestroika, 45 UKRAINIAN Q. 388, 397 (1989).
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desire to acquire control over the economic resources directed from
Moscow. 55
At the same time, it is clear that perestroika's introduction of market
principles represents significant economic, social, ideological, and legal
change. After limited initial measures, momentum toward market principles
at the All-Union level received an important boost in mid-1987, with the
Union's adoption of the Law on the State Enterprise and the joint adoption of
ten decrees by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) and the USSR Council of Ministers. 6 Several significant
reforms were formulated and announced over the following three years,
constituting important shifts toward the decentralization of economic power,
increases in individual enterprise autonomy, and liberalization of the rules
governing private enterprise and private property.57 However, this progress
was incremental because each element of these economic reforms was usually
considered as a self-contained package. In the larger All-Union economy, these
reforms were accompanied by an increasingly alarming federal budget deficit,
and a significant ruble "overhang" of money held involuntarily because of lack
of goods.58
The breakdown of the traditional economic system is not complete. Nor
has perestroika led to economic freedom. Rather, the transition period has
resulted in a crisis of confidence and a crisis of economic authority. One
western commentator has described a schizophrenic attitude in government
policies. Economic freedom has been legislated, but the bureaucratic apparatus
of a controlled economy has been left in place, and retains a variety of ways
of affecting economic behavior. 59 Another commentator described the result-
ing confusion as "centrally planned chaos. "60 Ministries remain able to use
broad control indicators, norms, and state orders to interfere in state enter-
prises' operations. 6' There is significant political, bureaucratic, and popular
55. S. KUX, supra note 24, at 62 ("The argument between the USSR government and the radical
reformers is not so much a dispute over the specific steps of transition towards a market economy, but a
struggle over the power of the central apparatus and the distribution of resources").
56. W. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 255 (2d ed. 1988).
57. See generally A. ASLUND, supra note 38; For a comprehensive account of legislative reforms,
see Hanson, Property Rights in the New Phase of Reforms, 6 SOVIET ECON. 95 (1990).
58. Ofer, Budget Defi cit, MarketDisequilibrium ajd Soviet Economic Reforms, 5 SOVIET ECON. 107,
124, 143 (1989) (citing estimates that the overhang, or "hot money," atthat time was around 80-100 billion
rubles). Though it is not at all clear, the size of the ruble overhang may have been reduced by Gorbachev's
drastic decree in January 1991 withdrawing all 50 and 100 ruble notes from circulation and limiting citizens'
and, apparently, cooperatives' withdrawals from banks to 500 rubles a month. See Fein, Soviets Withdraw-
ing 33% of Currency, N.Y. Times, Jan 23, 1991, at A3, col. 4; English excerpts of various articles from
Izvestiya and Pravda reprinted in 43 CumRENT DIG. SoVIET PREsS, Feb. 27, 1991, at 4-9.
59. Campbell, supra note 21, at 5; Grossman, supra note 50, at 93. See also Lipson, Piety and
Revision: How Will the Mandarins Survive Under the Rule of Law?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 191, 201-03
(1990) (Soviet bureaucracy can cope with change in a number of ways).
60. C. OSAKWE, SOVIET BusINEss LAW: INsTITrrTIONs, PRINCIPLES AND PRocEssEs xxii (1991).
61. M. LINDSAY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESs IN GORBACHEV'S SOVIET UNION 14-15 (1989).
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suspicion and resentment of private business activities, which restrict the
activities of cooperatives. 62 This feeds on the combination of shortages,
inefficiencies, and monopoly profits that are currently resulting from the steep
learning curve of business in a semi-market environment, the deliberately
monopolistic structure of much existing industry, and the often arbitrary mix
of controlled and uncontrolled activities. Also, there is evidence that a sub-
stantial proportion of the consumer "crisis" is due, not to a drop in production,
but to distribution through closed networks, speculation, and widespread
hoarding provoked by a loss of confidence in government policies. 63 Perhaps
such economic chaos during the transformation is to be expected, especially
when the politics of economic reform and the laws of economic activity are
of uncertain effect and duration.
The economic debate is integrally associated with political unrest at the All-
Union level. Discussion centered on the radical Abalkin and Shatalin plans of
October 1989 and September 1990, and the more conservative plans of Prime
Minister Ryzhkov of December 1989 and May 1990 and, most recently, Prime
Minister Pavlov's plan of April 1991. Little progress has been made, however,
toward the practical implementation of these plans.6' Schroeder's characteriza-
tion of previous Soviet economic reforms as a "treadmill" potentially remains
apt.65 The period after the tweny-eighth CPSU Congress in July 1990 was
one of vacillation preceding the reassertion of the conservative forces' influ-
ence against economic reform, nationalism, and democratization. This reasser-
tion was demonstrated by the resignation of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevard-
nadze.66 Gorbachev's adopted plan still involves a substantial transformation
toward market principles, but it appears there is neither substantial privatiza-
tion, 67 nor a sense that the leadership is committed to economic transforma-
tion. 68 It seems that many All-Union and other Soviet policymakers are still
62. Tedstrom, TheReemergence of Soviet Cooperatives, in DIEMMAS OF SoVIEr ECONOMIC REFORM,
supra note 21, at 131-34; Aage, supra note 38, at 13-15.
63. Schroeder, 'Crisis" in the Consumer Sector: A Comment, 6 SOvIET ECON. 56, 62-63 (1989).
64. McKinney, Confusion in Soviet Economic Reform, CU.RENT HIST. 317, 319 (1990); Richardson,
StillRunning in Place: SovietEconomic Reform Plans, 1 Brown University World Business Advisory, Nov.
1, 1990, at 1.
65. Schroeder, The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of *Reforms', in I SOVIET ECONOMY IN A TIME
OF CHANGE 312 (Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, 1979).
66. The Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, Izvestiya, Dec. 21, 1990, at 2-10, English
excerpts reprinted in 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 30, 1991, at 7-8 (excerpts of Shevardnadze's
resignation speech); Charodetev, The Minister'sDecision is Final, Izvestiya, Dec. 21, 1990, at 10, English
summary reprinted in 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 30, 1991, at 14-16.
67. Richardson, supra note 64, at 7; ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1991, at 18 (Pavlov pushed aside decisive
privatization in favor of worker management).
68. For Shatalin's own views on the recent history of economic reform, see S. Shatalin, You Can't
Use Evil to Fight Evil, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Jan. 22, 1991, at 2, English translation reprinted in 43
CURRENT DIG. SovIET PRESS, Mar. 6, 1991, at 1-4.
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trying to become "a little pregnant."69 While privatization has been an impor-
tant issue,7" the political process of economic reform reflected, and continues
to reflect, a complicated interplay among personalities, self-interest, ideology,
and perceptions of public opinion that have acted to prevent its implementation.
The dissolution of the old regime has opened new vistas for Ukrainians
interested in profitable, private economic activity. For the first time, managers
of state firms have to make many, and sometimes most, decisions about
production, distribution, and marketing.7 Forcibly freed from the frustrating
security of administrative flat, many state-owned businesses now make direct
contacts with private parties to undertake these tasks. The newly legalized
private cooperatives are gaining an increasing economic presence in Ukraine,
numbering 13,895 in 1989.2 Many cooperatives are contributing to the cre-
ation of a business lobby and to aspects of a business-enterprise culture. The
activities of black marketeers also serve as a living example of an alternative
economic system and dispel the view that private enterprise and initiative have
been crushed from homo Sovieticus. 3 There are many examples of sponta-
neous private Ukrainian business initiatives inventively exploiting market
opportunities. In Kiev, for instance, regulated taxis have been effectively
supplanted by an informal private market in transportation services.74
Additionally, in Ukraine, economic reforms and perestroika have main-
tained their own momentum, drawing on the forces of Ukrainian nationalism.
Historically, the Ukrainian economy has consistently represented about twenty
percent of the Soviet economy, with a significantly higher contribution in
agriculture, ferrous metals, and solid fuels, though a lower contribution in
construction and transportation.7' The Council of Ministers (Ukraine's execu-
tive branch of government) controls eleven planning and control ministries and
69. Popkova, Where are the Pirogi Meatier?, in PERESTROIKA AND THE ECONOMY: NEW THNKNG
IN SOvIET ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 99, 100 (this became a catchphrase for the controversial position
that there is no third way between socialism and capitalism).
70. Aslund, The Making of Economic Policy in 1989 and 1990, 6 SoVIEr ECON. 65, 90-91 (1990).
See also S. KUX, supra note 24, at 63 (political sensitivity of ownership issues and their relation to
nationalism).
71. See, e.g., Gassanov, Local Markets and Their Interaction with Big State-Run Enterprises, in
Conference Papers: Conference on Economic Reform in Ukraine (Ukrainian Research Institute, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) (Nov. 13-15, 1990) (unpublished collection).
72. Tedstrom, TheReemergence ofSoviet Cooperatives, in DILEMMAS OF SoVIET EcoNoMIc REFoRM,
supra note 21, at 104, 122-28.
73. Grossman, supra note 50, at 83-85.
74. Despite cheap, frequent, and regular public metro, bus, and tram services, many Kievites now
openly hitch car rides with strangers on the mutual and implicit understanding of a schedule of one to five
rubles, depending on the length of the ride.
75. Cohn, Economic Growth, in THE UKRAINE WiTHN THE USSR: AN ECONOMIC BALANCE SHEET
67, 78 (I. Koropeckyj ed. 1977) (Ukraine's economic analogue in the United States is the Great Lakes
region - Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin). Id. at 67-69 (significance of Ukraine for the
Soviet economy).
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committees, 76 twenty-five regional executive committees,' as well as the
five main economic departments at the republic level: Heavy Industry and Ma-
chine-Construction, Agro-Industrial, Construction, Transport and Communi-
cation, and Service Industries.78 Each department contains a number of minis-
tries, forty-five in total, and oversees a total of 116,647 enterprises, farms,
municipal organs, and groups thereof.79 The extent of the Ukrainian govern-
ment's economic oversight is matched only by the extent of its economic
problems.
The Ukrainian government's economic policy response is predominantly
cautious, but occasionally daring. Progress to date is limited but, overall,
moves have been in the general direction of a market-based economy. A recent
proposal to streamline the administrative structure of the economy involves
cutting the number of units in some levels of administration by over one-third,
but this still leaves a large administrative apparatus intact."0 There are reports
that a stock exchange was set up in Kharkiv, that a Commodities Exchange
is currently being established in Kiev, and that the Kiev City Executive
Committee has sold eighty-eight new apartments after having had received 400
applications.'I The most remarkable economic measure actually implemented
so far was in November 1990, when Ukraine took the startling step of issuing
a crude form of its own currency.82 Designed mainly to limit non-Ukrainians'
access to scarce goods and to curtail speculation, "coupons" were issued with
Ukrainian wages and were required to be redeemed to purchase most consumer
goods in short supply. The measure seems to have succeeded in stopping the
panic-buying and hoarding that was rife in October 1990.3
76. The ministries and committees are: the State Committee on the Economy, State Committee on
Prices, State Committee on Statistics, State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies, Ministry of
Finance, State Arbitration Committee, Ministry of Justice, Public Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, MinistryofInternal Affairs, and the Committee for State Security (KGB). 1 UKRAINIAN BUS. DIa.,
Jan. 22, 1991, at 6.
77. These regional economic committees supervise 141 City Executive Committees and 430 (rural)
District Executive Committees. Id.
78. *[O]il, gas, chemical, and machine-building enterprises, however, are under All-Union - i.e.,
the Kremlin's - direct control." Id.
79. These consist of: Social Development, 82,441 (24 ministries and state committees), Agro-
Industrial, 24,724 (four ministries and state committees), Heavy Industry, 3,680 (seven ministries and state
committee), Transport and Communication, 3,039 (six ministries and state committees), and Construction
2,763 (four ministries and state committees). Id. at 7-8.
80. 1 UKRAIAN Bus. DiG., Jan. 22, 1991, at 6-8.
81. Romanova, Stake Your Claims Now, Bus. USSR, Jan. 1991, at 42; Project on Economic Reform
in Ukraine, Reform Update (Mar. 1, 1991); Trehub, Perestroika and Social Entitlement, in DILEMMAS
OF SoVIET EcoNOMIc REFORM, supra note 21, at 207, 225.
82. Keller, Ukraine Introduces a Form of Currency, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1990, at 3, col. 4; 1
UKRAPNIAN Bus. DIG., Dec. 15, 1990, at D3.
83. Gross sales receipts apparently fell by 1.8 billion rubles in the month following the introduction
of coupons. Tsikova, Ukraine Eliminates Panic Buying, Izvestiya, Dec. 26, 1990, at 7, English summary,
reprinted in 42 CutrnNT DIG. SovIET PRESS, Jan. 30, 1991, at 30.
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The Supreme Soviet, pressured by Rukh, is currently discussing several
more far-reaching aspects of a radical economic reform strategy. These
discussions have spawned position papers prepared in October 1990 by the
Committee of the Supreme Soviet on Economic Reform on the creation of a
market economy, the denationalization of state property, and draft laws on
privatization of state-owned property, banks, investment policy, and the
financial system." The position paper on denationalization and the draft law
on privatization seem to suggest privatization of enterprises (except monop-
olies) by way of sale at market prices (30% to 40% of the shares of medium
and large-sized enterprises) and at nominal cost to citizens (60% to 70% of
the shares of medium and large-sized enterprises), with special privileges
reserved for workers of the enterprise and their families.'
The problems inherent in the economic transformation that Ukraine is
currently contemplating are, of course, enormous. The historical structure of
the economy means that important skills and institutions of a market economy
are lacking in Ukraine. Few concentrations of capital are available for com-
mercial investment.16 Capital markets in debt and equity as well as the popu-
lar understanding of the role of capital are very underdeveloped. Few people
have the necessary skills for assessing a business, monitoring management in
a competitive market environment, or making a financial valuation. The
domestic private sector is dwarfed by the state sector, which is often deliber-
ately structured in a monopolistic manner. Additionally, there are pervasive
conflicts of interest among state bureaucrats who are often mainly interested
in their own personal futures.
C. Law
The issue of Soviet nationalism is manifested in the fundamental constitu-
tional and legal conflict between the Constitutions of the USSR and Ukrainian
SSR and the July 1990 Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty. The 1977
Constitution of the USSR, though allowing for the possibility of secession from
the Union, 7 provides that union law has supremacy over republic law.88 The
84. These draft laws can be found in Background Reading Material, supra note 10.
85. Id. See also Savchenko, Privatization in Ukraine, 1 UKRAINIAN Bus. DIG., Mar. 28, 1991, at
1, 10.
86. Despite the ruble overhang, most private accumulations of money have been very concentrated.
See Feige, Perestroika and Socialist Privatization: Wh is To Be Done? And How?, 32 CoM. ECON.
STUD. 1, 31 & n.33 (1990) (seven out of eight people have no savings).
87. KONsT. SSSR art. 72, English translation reprinted in CoNsTrruToNs OF THE CoUnTRIEs OF THE
WORD, THE UNION OF SOvIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 31 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1990). In April
1990, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed legislation providing for complicated procedures (in 13 steps) for
secession. See Hazard, Gorbachev's Impact on the USSR Constitution, in CONsTrrTUrIONs OF THE
COUNiES OF THE WORLD, THE UNION OF SOVIET SocIALIST REPUBLiCS xv, xvii (A. Blaustein & G.
Flanz eds. 1990).
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1978 Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR acknowledges this supremacy.89 This
acknowledgment supports a conclusion that, domestically and internationally,
Ukraine is not itself a state,"° although that could conceivably change.9" In
practice, there was little controversy about such federalist arrangements while
central government and party institutions controlled and resolved political
issues. With the emergence of nationalism and pluralism under glasnost and
perestroika, the question of the location of power has become a subject ripe
for legal and political conflict and has led to a "war of laws." I In December
1988, a new Committee of Constitutional Supervision was established to deal
with the legal implications of such problems."
The declarations of sovereignty by a variety of Soviet Republics, including
Ukraine, pose a direct challenge to the Union government's historical central-
ized control. The severity of the challenge is recognized by the April 1990 All-
Union Laws that provide for a transition to substantial economic autonomy by
1991 .9 Several Republics are dissatisfied by this level of autonomy and want
full ownership of economic resources, control of production facilities, indepen-
dent budgets, control over banking, credit and money supply, and the recogni-
tion of inter-republic agreements.95 Direct inter-republic cooperation adds to
the pressure on the center. Ukraine has already signed protocols of intent with
twelve other republics and has concluded intergovernmental agreements with
five Republics, including the Russian SFSR. 96 These agreements, along with
negotiations over a new union treaty, indicate the direction in which power is
moving. However, the January 1991 crackdown in Lithuania and increased
powers of the KGB to investigate economic activity97 represent an important
88. KoNsT. SSSR art. 76, English translation reprinted in CoNsTrrroNs OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 32 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1990).
89. KONST. UK. SR art. 71. See also KONST. UK. SSR art. 68 (voluntary nature of union by this
.sovereign" republic with the republics). See also supra note 34 and accompanying text (agreement to make
the Ukrainian Constitution consistent with the Declaration of Sovereignty).
90. T. Kis, supra note 13, at 28-34.
91. Id. at 72-74 (Ukraine has potential to become a state and that establishment of international
diplomatic and consular relations would imply de jure recognition of international personality). In this
regard, note that Germany and the United States have opened consulates in Kiev. 1 UKRAINIAN BUS. DIG.,
Feb. 22, 1991, at 1; 1 UKRANA Bus. DIG., Jan. 22, 1991, at 11; 1 UKRAINIAN BUS. DIG., Mar. 28,
1991, at 2. One commentator has reported that Ukraine intends to become more active in the United
Nations. S. KuX, supra note 24, at 71.
92. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1991, at A9, col. 1 (characterization in Gorbachev's latest program of
recovery).
93. Hausmaninger, The Committee of constitutional Supervision of the USSR, 23 CoRNELL INT'L L.J.
287, 289 (1990).
94. Law on the USSR, Republic Economic 77es, Izvestiya, Apr. 16, 1990, at 1-2, English translation
reprinted in 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, July 18, 1990, at 17-19; Law on the Demarcation of the
Powers of the USSR and the Members of the Federation, Izvestiya, May 3, 1990, at 1-2, English translation
reprinted in 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Jun. 13, 1990, at 23.
95. S. KuX, supra note 24, at 57-58.
96. 1 UKRAINIAN Bus. DIG., Dec. 15, 1990, at 8.




setback to the apparent trend of economic decentralization. The conflict is
essentially political. It reflects the new challenges of pluralism to the power
of the central institutions of government and the Communist Party, which are
no longer able to resolve such issues internally. Negotiations between Repub-
lics and the center continue on the formulation of a new union treaty. 91 Even-
tually, the issues of republic nationalism will be resolved either politically,
through negotiation, or militarily, through a return to central repression or civil
war.
99
While the new constitutional order continues to emerge in response to
politics, it also engenders uncertainty about the future of economic reform. The
future location of power will determine the interpretation and validity of laws
passed today. The effect of this uncertainty on economic reform is itself
uncertain. Realism suggests that legal measures that are within the effective
power of the Ukrainian government will have defacto effect, even if constitu-
tionally dubious. It is on the margins of such effective power, where political
conflict is most apparent, that economic reform will be most affected. A
particularly significant area is the allocation of ownership of property between
the USSR and the Republics."
The traditional role of law in the Soviet economy has been to reinforce and
facilitate the centralized administration of economic activity.1"' Indeed, there
was a Soviet legal debate as to whether the aspects of law governing economic
activity deserve status and codification as a separate body of law."e Law
governed the nature and characteristics of property, which were fundamental
to the Soviet economic system. 3 Law provided the formal mechanism by
which planners micro-managed the activities of an enterprise and the relation-
ships between enterprises. From 1965 to 1986, this direction became less
focused as enterprise autonomy was enhanced with respect to planning,
98. A draft union treaty was released in late November 1990. Draft: Union Treaty, Pravda, Nov. 24,
1990, at 3, English translation reprinted in 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Dec. 26, 1990, at 14. Another
was published in March 1991, but was immediately attacked by Boris Yeltsin, President of the RSFSR,
and by four Republics, which declared they would not sign it. See Schmenann, Moscow Publishes New
Plan of Union, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1991, at A3, col. 1. In April 1991, a significant agreement was
reached between Gorbachev and the leaders of nine Republics, including Ukraine, that recognized the
necessity of negotiation among sovereign republics. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1991, § 4, at 1, 3.
99. See, e.g., Brovkin, The Politics of Constitutional Reform: The New Power Structure and the Role
of the Party, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 323, 338-39 (1990); ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1991, at 17.
100. Maggs, Constitutional Implications of Changes in Property Rights in the USSR, 23 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 363 (1990).
101. Ioffe, Law and Economy in the USSR, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1591 (1982); see generally 0. IoFFE
& P. MAG S, THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1987).
102. See generally W. BUTLER, supra note 56, at 252-54; V. LAPTEV, ECONoMIc LAW (1987).
103. See generally G. ARMSTRONG, THE SOVIET LAW OF PROPERTY: THE RIGHT TO CONTROL
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNISM (Law in Eastern Europe No. 26, 1983); see also
Kulikov, The Structure and Forms of Socialist Property, in PERESTROIKA AND THE ECONOMY: NEW
THINKING IN SOVIET ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 217.
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contracts, and legal personality; hierarchical control was exercised more
through target-setting and plan-approval. "o4
The union-wide policy ofperestroika has involved constitutional and legal
changes."0 The progressive relaxation of government involvement in private
business is reflected in the laws from 1986 to 1990.1 6 The 1986 law on
individual labor activity allows, for example, the establishment of part-time,
small-scale private family businesses."° The August 1988 guidelines for
leasing enterprises limit the involvement of state authorities in the operation
of a leased business.' 8 The July 1988 All-Union Law on Cooperatives pro-
vides a remarkable vehiclefor the organization of private businesses indepen-
dent of the government, even though more recent decrees restrict some areas
of activity and institute some price controls. 1"9
Since November 1989, significant new All-Union laws and resolutions have
been passed regarding leasing, ownership in general, land, business units in
general, joint-stock companies, securities, a currency market, small business,
an All-Union holding company, foreign investment, and banking."u In De-
cember 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies announced plans to create
the structure for privatization by the summer of 1990,111 a timetable which
proved hopelessly optimistic. In February 1991, the State Commission on
Economic Reform released to the media a draft Principles of USSR and
Republic Legislation on the Destatization of Property and the Privatization of
Enterprises."' It reportedly suggests the sale of enterprises to Soviet and
foreign citizens and organizations at auction, with special privileges reserved
for workers, credit extended to citizens, and a certain proportion given to the
new owners free of charge.' However, the relationship between these draft
principles and any future enacted All-Union legislation is nebulous and their
relationship to Ukrainian policy even more so.
1 4
104. W. BUTLER, supra note 56, at 245-52.
105. See generallySymposium, Perspectiveson the Legal Perestroika: Soviet ConstitutionalandLegis-
laive Changes, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 187 (1990); THE IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA ON SOVIET LAW (A.
Schmidt ed. 1990).
106. For a recent, comprehensive review of laws affecting businesses, see generally C. OsAKWE, supra
note 60.
107. Tedstrom, The Reemergence of Soviet Cooperatives, in DILEMMAS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC
REFORM, supra note 21, at 83-84.
108. Id. at 86-90.
109. Id. at 114-21.
110. Hanson, supra note 57, at 100-09; Maggs, supra note 100, at 368-73; 2 PARKER SCH. BULL.
SOVIET & EAST EuR. L., Feb. 1991, at5.
111. Maggs, supra note 100, at 369.
112. Zhagel, Parting WordsfromL. Abalkin, Izvestiya, Feb. 5, 1991, at2, English summary reprinted
in 43 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Mar. 6, 1991, at 26.
113. Id. (draft principles apparently released in conjunction with draft Law on Entrepreneurial Activity
and draft Law on Demonopolizing the Economy).
114. These relationships are dependent on future political developments. It is worth noting that Mr.
Abalkin, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Commission on Economic Reform,
stated at the release of the draft principles that he did not see a place for himself in the new cabinet. He
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The vast majority of enterprises remain in state ownership, though the
particular identities of the state bodies that own any particular enterprise is
often difficult to establish." 5 Most productive property is still under the
operative management and influence of a variety of union, republic, and city
ministries and departments, executive committees of local soviets, planning
agencies, committees, and various production associations." 6 The June 1987
Law on the State Enterprise (Association) conferred more operational freedom
on enterprises, while rationalizing the planning apparatus." 7 Enterprise plan-
ning is now much less integrated with long-term state economic planning, but
state organs still have significant legaland administrative power over several
sorts of enterprise activities."' Contract law is supposed to be evolving from
an administrative system of penalties for breach toward a system based on the
recovery of damages for breach of contract. 19
Many aspects of law are inadequate for the process of transformation and
for the economic system it will create. Some aspects of western commercial
exchange are simply not covered by any legal provisions, as the scope of
individuals' economic activities outpace the tortured process of legal reform.
Some aspects of the new laws oriented toward market behavior are ironically
frustrated by the imposing legacy of the socialist economic system. For
instance, assessing damages for breach of contract in a semi-reformed econom-
ic system may well induce more economic uncertainty than the previous system
of administrative penalties. 2 ' New laws are often vaguely drafted, either to
cover political compromise or disagreement,' 2' or simply due to the evolution
of new legislative drafting procedures.'I In such cases, it is difficult to de-
termine legality in particular circumstances." New laws may also be incon-
sistent with other laws, new or old, and may not be publicly available. Laws
frequently lack the necessary provision for implementation and administration.
cited missed opportunities for economic reform and called for the preservation of the State Commission
under the new cabinet. Id.
115. A working group of republic representatives on the division of property was reported as being
established by the USSR Council of Ministers. Zhagel, On the Topic of the Day: Own, Possess and Use,
Izvestiya, July 2, 1990, at 1, English summary reprinted in 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 1,
1990, at 20. The problem is essentially political.
116. W. BUTLER, supra note 56, at 180-88. loffe, Soviet Law and the New Economic Experiment,
in SOVIET LAW AND ECONOMY 3, at 22-28 (0. Ioffe & M. Janis eds. 1987).
117. Hazard, Gorbachev's Visionfor the State Enterprise, in THE IMPACT OF PERESTROIKAON Sovmr
LAW, supra note 105, at 192.
118. W. BUTLER, supra note 56, at 255-60; D. LANE, supra note 22, ch. 2.
119. Kroll, Reform and Damages for Breach of Contract in the Soviet Economy, 5 SOVIET ECON. 276
(1989).
120. Id. at 294.
121. Kurashvili, Restructuring and the Enterprise, in PERESTROIKA AND THE ECONOMY: NEW
THINKING IN SOVIET ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 21, 27-28.
122. Belousovitch, The New Soviet Parliament: Process, Procedures, and Legislative Priority, 23
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 275, 280-81 (1990).
123. Roucek, supra note 37, at 47-48.
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Drafters seemingly envisage that exhortatory statements of policy will ensure
compliance with laws that in fact require government establishment of adminis-
trative institutions or procedures. The Ukrainian currency issuance in Novem-
ber 1990 provides one example. In addition to the economic problems of this
measure, the issuance revealed inadequate attention to necessary administrative
institutions and procedures and the potential for corruption. These inadequacies
are characteristic of the new Soviet law, but there are some reports that the
quality and availability of economic legislation are improving. 24
Perhaps surprisingly to a western lawyer, law is largely irrelevant to much
of the current economic activity in Ukraine. The concept of the rule of law
that underlies all western economic behavior is still missing, despite an official
embrace of the concept." Business people and bureaucrats are accustomed
to most economic activity being directed by administrative discretion and fiat.
Officials at different levels continue to use their legal powers to direct econom-
ic activity." For example, there are reports that officials have ignored,
opposed, and sabotaged the operation of leased enterprises and coopera-
tives. 7 Yet, other laws are simply disregarded and unenforced. An official
who does not like a particular law may not enforce it. One Soviet commentator
has referred to this bureaucratic attitude as "legalized lawlessness. "12' Gosar-
bitrazh, the state commercial arbitration agency, reportedly refused to handle
disputes involving the rights of state enterprises to reject state orders." 9 The
traditional, centralized, bureaucratic levers for controlling economic behavior
(i.e., criminal law, directives, material incentives, and moral incentives), are
not suited to government activities in a market economy. 30 Corruption,
patronage, and the networks of the second economy induce further arbitrariness
in official behavior.' Indeed, one commentator characterizes the operation
of the second economy as developing a system of informal private property
124. Papachristov, An Evolving Legal Culture, BUS. USSR, Jan. 1991, at58 (laws have become more
consistent and comprehensive over time); Butler, Modern Patterns of Law Reform in the Soviet Union, in
THE IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA ON SovIET LAW, supra note 105, at 47 (regarding improvements in
codification processes and substance).
125. Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State Under the Rule of Law: An Overview, 23 CORNELL INT'L
L. J. 205 (1990).
126. But see Quigley, The New SovietLaw on Appeals: Glasnost in the Soviet Courts, 37 INT'L COMP.
L. Q. 172 (1988); and Quigley, supra note 125, at 216 (regarding the Law on Appeals, allowing citizens
to seek judicial review of illegal bureaucratic decisions).
127. Leasing and Cooperatives Play Important Role in Denationalization of Property in USSR, I
PARKER ScH. BULL. SOVIET & EAST EtR. L., Nov. 1990, at 8.
128. Yakovlev, Perestroika or the Death of Socialism", in VOICES OF GLASNOST: INTERVMWS WTH
GORBACHEV'S REFORMERS, supra note 22, at 33.
129. Kroll, PropertyRights dnd the SovietEnterprise:EvidencefromtheLawofContract, 13 J. COMP,
EcON. 115, 130 (1989).
130. Orland, Perspectives on Soviet Economic Crime, in SOVIET LAW AND ECONOMY, supra note
116, at 169, 206-11 (criminal sanctions for economic activity may have involved little enforcement and
were mainly important as mechanisms for political control). P. JOHNSON, REDESIoNING THE COMMUNIST
ECONOMY: THE POLICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE 142-43 (1989).
131. See Grossman, supra note 50.
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rights supported by customary norms of the Soviet underground networks and
corrupt patronage throughout officialdom.132 While such influences may work
in the direction of economic freedom, they have also encouraged a widespread
disrespect and disregard for the rule of law."' Many Ukrainian business peo-
ple believe that any law could go unenforced, depending on the inclination and
political judgments of a relevant official at any level. This leads to tremendous
uncertainty for business decisions and to corruption and arbitrariness in
government. The substantive content of Ukrainian law today does not yet
accord with western understandings of the role of law in a market economy.
D. Summary
The above three sections provide background information about the politics,
economy, and law in Ukraine. They provide the context in which any program
for privatization must operate and the factors that must be taken into account
in the formulation of a program. There are clearly large political, economic,
and legal impediments to formulating and implementing a program of privatiza-
tion in Ukraine. That is true of all the reforms necesary for the transformation
of the Ukrainian economic system. At the same time, a substantial political,
economic, and legal momentum has gathered force in the direction of some
such transformation. To undertake such a transformation requires a coherent
integrated strategy and as much information and advice as are available."M
The intertwining political, social, cultural, economic, and legal aspects of
reform in Ukraine mean that the occurrence and nature of the transformation
must be determined by Ukrainians.
m. PRIVATIZATION
A. Context: Moving to a Market Economy
Privatization only makes sense in an economy based on market principles
which is fundamentally different from the traditional Soviet economic sys-
tem. 131 In essence, the general preconditions for the existence and proper
132. Id. at 81-82. See also id. at 85 (vested interests in the second economy opposed legalization of
freer economic activity to protect their own positions).
133. Id. at 86.
134. See, e.g., Memorandum from Graham Allison of Harvard University, Joseph C. Bell of Hogan
& Hartson, Henry Hansmann of Yale Law School, and William Hogan of Harvard University, to City
Council of Kiev (June 22, 1990) (discussing strategy for the transition to a market economy), in Background
Reading Material, supra note 10; W. Hogan, J. Bell, J. Hewko, & C. Kedzie, Conceptual Framework for
the Creation of a Market Economy in Ukraine (Oct. 10, 1990) (unpublished manuscript), in id.
135. See K. ScHENK, NEWlNSTrTirUONALDIMENsIoNSOF ECONOMCS: COMPARATIVEELABORATION
AND APPLICATION (1988) (examining behavioral and economic consequences of different directory,
regulatory, and commercial economic systems).
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functioning of a market economy can be seen not as rules dictating behavior,
but rather as the absence of such rules. These preconditions include: the
freedom for anyone to own property, to buy and sell goods and services at
freely negotiated prices, and to establish a business organization. They also
include: the freedom for any firm to enter any market, to decide what to
produce, how much to produce, whom to employ, what prices to ask, and
whether to spend or keep the business profits earned.136
Market prices function as signals to producers about what production and
marketing decisions to make. Individual producers are motivated by their own
positive and negative incentives. It is not necessary that producers or consum-
ers understand the conceptual basis of a market economy. 37 Instead, they
merely have to respond to the incentives created. In theory, these incentives,
and the operation of prices that are formed by free markets, induce people and
firms to act efficiently. A market economy is made up of the interactions of
many such individuals, groups, firms, and other organizations. They freely
transact with each other to produce and distribute the goods and services used
by society as a whole. Overall, through freely and individually negotiated
prices, such production and distribution should efficiently respond to consu-
mers' demands and to producers' constraints.
It is impossible to understand a market economy without first understanding
its legal framework. Through creating and enforcing property rights, law pro-
vides the basic building blocks of an economy. Laws regarding securities,
business organizations, labor relations, and commercial transactions facilitate
the establishment and operation of different kinds of businesses. Law may also
limit anticompetitive behavior to protect free market competition; it may also
serve as the vehicle for government impositions on business (e.g., in the form
of taxes). Most importantly, however, law in a market economy should guaran-
tee and define market freedoms while protecting the public from market
manipulation. It should not attempt to enforce economic efficiency by prescrib-
ing or enforcing efficient behavior for people or firms. In this respect, the
importance of freedom in western economies means that the role of economic
law is very different than it has been in the USSR. Laws should be clear in
their meaning and in the procedures by which they are interpreted and applied.
Laws guarantee market freedom by assuming that any activity is allowed unless
there is a law forbidding it.
The importance of freedom to the economics of market behavior means
that both law and politics are important influences on a market economy. The
ability of a government to interfere with any private market transactions of its
136. For the list of freedoms upon which this list was based, see J. KORNAI, THE ROAD TO A FREE
ECONOMY: SHFrING FROM A SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE EXAMPLE OF HUNGARY 39-40 (1990).
137. For factual support of this assertion in the form of a comparative survey of popular attitudes
toward free markets, see R. SHILLER, supra note 39.
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citizens is second-nature to Ukrainians, but inimical to market activity. If a
government is willing to use its power to interfere, the incentives of individual
market participants become distorted, as they try to predict the nature and
extent of government interference. In the extreme, individual incentives
become vitally bound up with government preferences and actions. Economic
activity comes to be effected by administrative fiat, and the ordinary provisions
of law become irrelevant -- a mindset with which Ukrainians have become
familiar.
It is thus clear that the political, social, and cultural climate is important
to the efficient functioning of a market economy. Factors that affect the
likelihood of arbitrary government interference in individual market transac-
tions affect the functioning of a market economy. These include the nature and
stability of constitutional arrangements, democratic principles, and of the
ideologies of those in government and in the public at large. Even stable,
democratic western governments with long-established free enterprise cultures
are often tempted to intervene in economic activities by providing special
subsidies, or by imposing special taxes or tariffs on certain industries (e.g.,
agriculture). These-may be politically popular, but most economists generally
regard them as distorting the price signals generated by the free market,
thereby reducing economic efficiency in the long run.
On the other hand, a government in a market economy does not abdicate
its power to address social concerns, 3 ' though such a perspective has been
implied by a Soviet economist, presumably for rhetorical purposes.' 39 Eco-
nomists themselves recognize justifications for the existence of government
actions. These include addressing market failure through production of public
goods and the correction of externalities." Social equity considerations
provide a redistributive justification for government activity.' 4 ' Social poli-
cies may be advanced through the personal income tax system, the government
purchase or provision of social services, and through a social welfare system
charged with allocating resources to those people the government identifies as
most in need. Western nations differ in the extent to which their governments
provide such services and the methods by which they are provided. Ukrainians
138. See Priest, Introduction: The Aims of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1988).
139. Schmelyov, The Rebirth of Common Sense, in VOICES OF GLASNOST: INTERVIEWS WITH
GORBACHEV'S REFORMERS, supra note 22, at 140, 151-52 (stating, then qualifying "Shmelyov's Law* as
"[e]verything that is economically inefficient is immoral and everything that is economically efficient is
moral").
140. See, e.g., D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II: A REVISED EDrTIONOF PUBLIC CHOICE 9-12 (1989).
Public goods are goods that can be provided to an additional consumer at no cost (i.e., with a marginal
cost of zero). Examples include a society's legal system of property rights and enforcement procedures,
as well as such services as national defense, and police and fire protection services. Externalities include
environmental or other effects of economic activity that are not reflected in market pricing.
141. Id. at 37-39.
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must choose their own preferred degree of emphasis on social welfare. But the
means selected should not disrupt productive efficiency.
B. Theory: Reasons for Privatization
It is obvious from the above description of a market economy that many
related reforms have to be formulated and implemented if market principles
are to be constituted as the basis of the Ukrainian economy. Privatization, in
the sense of "de-governmentalization,"142 is one aspect of this overall pro-
gram. This article focuses on the privatization of productive property that is
currently owned by the state and not on the broader meaning of privatization,
defined as: "the act of reducing the role of government, or increasing the role
of the private sector, in an activity or the ownership of assets. ""143 This article
is concerned only with property or resources that are used for commercial
production rather than, for example, residential property. It is important to
distinguish between three related concepts: the existence of private property,
the existence of private ownership of enterprise, and the transfer of state
ownership of enterprise to private hands. Only the last of these concepts
constitutes privatization in the sense used in this article, though it is predicated
on the other two concepts.
1. Private Property
Private ownership of property is a vital element of market economies, and
it illustrates the importance of market freedom.'" "Property rights in fact
measure the degree of the holder's liberty; the amount of property together
with the rights, the degree of his power." '145 Using a western conception of
private property rights implies a different relationship between the collective
and individuals"4 than does a Soviet legal conception of property. 147 TWO
main elements of private property can be distinguished: the right to receive
142. This translates as razgosudarstvleniye, a horrible term that elucidates the meaning ofprivatization
for Ukrainians.
143. E. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 3 (1987). In addition to transfer
of government property, this broader definition includes: the contracting out by government to the private
sector for any specific good or service that it wants produced; the distribution of vouchers as entitlement
for needy citizens to buy certain goods and services; the charging of user fees for government services;
and the deregulation of industry. See D. LINOWES, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EF7ECTIVE GOVERN-
MENT - REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRiVATIZATION 1-2 (1988).
144. C. VELUANOVSICI, SELLING THE STATE: PRIVATISATION IN BRITAIN 77-92 (1987).
145. Nutter, Markets Without Property: A Grand llussion, in THE EcoNoMIcs OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
217, 221 (E. Furubotn & S. Pejovich eds. 1974).
146. On the importance of property in encapsulating the inherent tension between the individual and
the collective, see Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127 (1990).
147. See, e.g., Pejovich, Towards a General Theory of Property Rights, in THE ECONOMICS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 145, at 341.
Vol. 16:453, 1991
Privatization in Ukraine
the profits made from the use of the property, and the right to control the use
and transfer of the property.148 These rights of ownership allow and encour-
age individuals to respond efficiently to market incentives. The informal system
of property rights developed in the second Soviet economy mirrors many
aspects of western conceptions of property, but is based on more arbitrary
enforcement mechanisms with less social legitimacy.149
Private property rights are also important with respect to productive
organizations. In western economies, the primary form of business organization
is the limited liability, investor-owned company. The two main differences
between privately and publicly-owned enterprises are the existence in private
enterprises of freely transferable property rights in the residual claim and
differences in institutional goals. 150 Sometimes, governments in market econ-
omies own productive enterprises in order to control the behavior of a monopo-
ly, provide a good or service that the free market does not provide (because
of market failure), or to achieve redistributive aims. Recently, however, there
has been an international trend toward privatization in which governments sell
their ownership of productive enterprises. "[Privatization] involves the transfer
and redefinition of a complex bundle of property rights which creates a whole
new penalty/reward system which alters a firm's incentives as well as its
performance. " 151
2. Privatization in a Market Economy
Western economic literature contains several arguments for and against the
privatization of government-owned enterprises in a predominantly market
economy. The efficiency arguments for privatization are most convincing when
they focus on the incentives of private owners and managers compared with
the incentives of government departments and politicians. 5 ' The motive of
private shareholders of a private business is usually profit maximization, which
provides incentives for the business to be managed more efficiently than when
the government is owner. The political motives of politicians and the ease with
which they can interfere with the management of a government-owned enter-
148. See Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. L. EcON. & ORG. 267 (1988). Cf. Schroeder,
Property Rights Issues in Economic Reforms in Socialist Countries, 21 SrUD. CoMP. COMMUNISM 175,
176 (1988) (accepting ownership and control as fundamental aspects of property rights).
149. See Grossman, supra note 50, at 81-82.
150. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 449, 481-85 (1988).
151. Veljanovski, Privatization in Britain - the Institutional and Constitutional Issues, 71 MARQ. L.
REV. 558, 570 (1988).
152. See, e.g., Sappington & Stiglitz, Privatization, Informatiwon and Incentives, 6 . PoL'Y ANALYsIs
MGMT. 567 (1987); De Alessi, On the Nature and Consequences of Private and Public Enterprises, 67
MINN. L. REV. 191 (1982) (incentive structures of public and private enterprises); McFetridge, The
Efficiency Consequences of Privatization, in PAPERS ON PRIVATIZATION 109 (W. Stanbury & T. Kierans
eds. 1985).
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prise do not often provide such efficiency-promoting incentives."5 3 Conse-
quently, many government organizations tend to be inhibited by inflexible and
commercially inappropriate bureaucratic rules concerning the payment of
workers and the acquisition of equipment. They also tend to face "soft" budget
constraints in that if government-owned businesses lose money, they can
usually get more from the government. This contrasts with the commercial
discipline of financial markets for a privately-owned enterprise. There are
several established market practices and institutions for reducing the agency
costs between principal-owners and agent-managers in a privately-owned
firm."5 4 Commercial discipline comes from the monitoring of an enterprise
by those who lend money to the firm, by the firm's owners, and from the
threat of takeover by another enterprise if efficiency, and therefore share price,
falls significantly. Privatization could thus theoretically yield efficiency
gains. 15
Supporters of government ownership argue that the government can try to
duplicate private sector incentives. 5 6 It seems theoretically possible to sub-
stantially improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises by structuring them
in a commercial manner, providing them with clear and consistent goals,
allowing management to have substantial operational autonomy, access to
private financial markets, and establishing a monitoring regime over their
operations. 7 Indeed, the New Zealand government followed this course
during the late 1980s,158 and has apparently succeeded in improving the effi-
ciency of government-owned enterprises. However, the question then arises
as to why the government wants to own such commercially- oriented enterpris-
es. More importantly, the efficiency of these enterprises is still directly depen-
dent on the political environment at any given moment. The political value of
efficiency in government-owned enterprises, the amount of information that
is publicly available about these enterprises, and the competitiveness of the
153. Sappington & Stiglitz, supra note 152; Zeckhauser & Horn, Control and Performance of State-
Owned Enterprises, in PRIVATIZATION AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: LESSONS FROM THE UN1TED
STATES, GREAT BRrrAIN AND CANADA 7-57 (P. MacAvoy, W. Stanbury, G. Yarrow & R. Zeckhauser
eds. 1989); Eckel & Vermaelen, Internal Regulation: The Effects of Government Ownership on the Value
of the Finn, 29 J. L. & ECON. 381 (1986).
154. See generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Corporations and Private Property: A Conference
Sponsored by the Hoover Institution, 26 J. L. & ECON. 235 (1983).
155. Caves, Lessons from Privatization in Britain: State Enterprise Behavior, Public Choice, and
Corporate Governance, 13 J. ECoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 145 (1990).
156. See, e.g., Lange, On the Economic Theory of Socialism (pts. 1 & 2), 4 REV. ECON. STUD. 53,
123 (1936-37) (classical efficiency justification for socialist ownership).
157. See, e.g., M. HARIRIAN, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN A MIXED ECONOMY: MICRO VERSUS
MACRO ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES (1989); Deane, Public SectorReform:A Review of the Issues, in PURPOSE
PERFORMANCE AND PROFIT: REDEFINING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 12 (Studies in Public Administration No.
32, M. Clark & E. Sinclair eds. 1986); Palmer, Directions for State Enterprise, in id. at 25.
158. THE TREASURY, BRIEFING TO THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT 89-90 (1990); Palmer, The State-
Owned Enterprises Act 1986: Accountability?, 18 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON. L. REV. 169 (1988).
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political environment all influence whether a government will continue to
refrain from interfering in the operations of an enterprise.
This article suggests that if there are no social goals for which a govern-
ment needs to own enterprises, and most social goals are better achieved
through other means, then it is better to privatize enterprises that operate in
competitive markets. Competition is the important caveat. Most western
analysts consider the competitive structure of an industry to have more of an
impact on efficiency than on the question of ownership.159 Where an industry
is monopolistic, the advantages of private ownership are much more disputable.
The question of the best methods to regulate monopolies is much debated in
western economic theory, but government-ownership is one of the options.
Another argument for privatization, often used by governments in predomi-
nantly market economies, concerns the government's own financial position.
Privatization by sale produces money that governments can use to reduce a
budget deficit. Although superficially attractive, such a sale contains an
economic problem that: the price a government gets for an enterprise should
be equivalent to the discounted net present value of the expected future net
earnings from the enterprise were the enterprise to remain under government
control. 160 Making money on a sale requires the enterprise to be worth more
in private than in government hands. In summary, if privatization of an
enterprise by sale is to positively affect the government's financial position,
then the government should try to ensure that: the proceeds from privatization
are used to repay debt rather than finance current spending; the rate of interest
of the debt that is able to be repaid is more than the rate of future income from
the enterprise; and finally that the enterprise is more profitable in private
ownership than government ownership, and the government captures some of
this extra profitability in the sale's price.' Privatization can also be justified
on the grounds of reducing debt if a government's total debt position is unsus-
tainable, or if the macroeconomic effects of high government debt are consid-
ered undesirable.
In market economies debt reduction is, in general, an unconvincing argu-
ment for privatization of government enterprises, and the efficiency justifica-
tion is primarily driven by the effects of political interference on commercial
business operations. The most difficult conceptual task is in determining which
159. See generally PRIVATISATION AND COMPETITION: A MARKET PROSPECTUS (C. Veljanovski ed.
1989); Yarrow, Privatization in Theory and Practice, 1 EcoN. POL'Y 324-25, 373-75 (1986); Hemming
& Mansoor, Privatization and Public Enterprises, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND OCCASIONAL PAPER
No. 56, 12 (1988).
160. See, e.g., Heller & Schiller, The Fiscal Impact of Privatization. With Some Examplesfrom Arab
Countries, 17 WORLD DEV. 757, 758-59 (1989).
161. See Mansoor, The Fiscal Impact of Privatisation, in PRIVATISATION IN LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES 180 (P. Cook & C. Kirkpatrick eds. 1988).
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activities should lie within the government's purview, and which of those
should be undertaken through ownership of an enterprise.162
3. Privatization in Ukraine
In some ways the conceptual justification for privatization is easier in
Ukraine, where the government owns most of the productive property. The
most important engines of growth in a newly-marketized economy may be new
firms set up and developed under market conditions.163 However, in moving
to a market economy in Ukraine, it will not be sufficient to simply allow new
private organizations to emerge and dominate price-setting and hence resource
all6cation in the Ukrainian economy. While the growth of cooperatives has
been rapid, the time necessary for such a transformation to occur on its own
would be substantial. Continuing economic difficulties over such a period, and
the social and political consequences, could well stifle the whole program of
reform.
Furthermore, for the political reasons presented in Part II, it is inconceiv-
able that the Ukrainian economic apparatus of government could be reformed
so as to provide effective efficiency incentives for state-owned enterprises. In
Ukraine, the temptation for politicians, steeped in government interference,
to interfere with productive enterprises would prove too great. It also would
be too difficult to isolate state-owned enterprises from political pressures.1"
Because of the dominance of these enterprises and property, this would
negatively affect the functioning of the entire Ukrainian economy. Further-
more, the current breakdown in hierarchical government authority in Ukraine
means that it would probably be difficult to prevent privatization from occur-
ring in one form or another.
At the level of general principle, it seems clear that, in order for market
principles to have their greatest beneficial effect on the production and distribu-
tion of goods and services, control of most productive property should be
exercised by individuals rather than by the government.165 This is best guar-
anteed by transferring ownership of state property in the western sense to non-
governmental organizations, groups and individuals, and by privatizing existing
productive state property. By allowing individual firms and people to control
most Ukrainian productive property in order to produce and distribute goods
and services in free markets, privatization would set the basis for a market
162. See Chamberlin & Jackson, Ptivatization as Institutional Choice, 6 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS MOmff.
586 (1987).
163. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1991, at F3, col. 1 (western economists' doubts on Eastern
European policymakers' emphasis on privatization of existing enterprises).
164. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 21, at 9.
165. Id. at 18.
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economy. Privatization is the logical extension of relying on the beneficial
incentives of market forces. "IThere is a strong logic that leads from market-
socialist reforms to reforms of ownership."" Privatization should not be the
first element of the transformation to a market economy, nor should it be the
most important. But it should involve the most major restructuring of existing
property relationships of any of the elements of reform. The issue of privatiza-




By 1988, privatization of state-owned enterprises had been, or was in the
process of being, implemented by a variety of methods in a large and diverse
range of countries. Methods of full privatization have included the following:
public offerings, private sales, sales of assets, fragmentation, and employee
or management buy-outs.167 The nations that use these methods include:
twenty-three nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, eleven nations in Asia, five Pacific
countries, two nations in North America, eleven nations in Latin America and
the Caribbean, and seventeen nations in Western Europe, the Middle East and
North Africa. Enterprises have been privatized in the following sectors:
agriculture/agri-business, oil/mining, manufacturing, transportation, tourism,
infrastructure/construction services, public services and utilities, finance, and
retail/trading. 16
There is also a range of rationales for privatization. 69 Several nations
have wished to improve efficiency through private ownership, while others
have wanted to reduce budget deficits or the amount of government resources
flowing to enterprises. Other states have pursued macroeconomic objectives,
such as instilling confidence in the economy or creating competitive financial
markets. Political ideology and popularity have dominated privatizations in
some countries. The assessment of these privatization programs continues.
Present thinking, however, indicates that there are attractive arguments for
166. Hanson, Ownership Issues in Perestroika, in DILEMMAS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM, supra
note 21, at 65, 71-73. Cf. Bait, Property in Capital and in the Means of Production in Socialist Economies,
11 J. L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1968) (reversing this logic to the effect that taking enterprise independence
seriously implies private ownership rights in firms).
167. C. VUYLSTEKE, 1 TECHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: METHODS
AND IMPLEMENTATION annex E (World Bank Technical Paper No. 88, 1988); R. CANDOY-SEKSE, 3
TECHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: INVENTORY OF COUNTRY EXPERIENCE
AND REFERENCE MATERIALS (World Bank Technical Paper No. 90, 1988).
'168. C. VUYLSTEKE, supra note 167; R. CANDOY-SEKSE, supra note 167.
169. Vernon-wortzel & Wortzel, Privatization: Not the Only Answer, 17 WORLD DEv. 633, 635
(1989); Holle, Privatization - A Global Perspective, 4 PRIVATIZATION REV. 6 (1988).
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privatization of businesses facing competition, while the arguments for privat-
ization of monopolies are more tenuous.
There are no completed precedents for privatization as an element of
fundamental transformation to a market economy. Ukrainians should closely
watch the developing experience of other Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe-
an countries.17 The example of Poland is discussed below. Many former
large, East German enterprises are being rapidly privatized in Germany,
though the program faces significant economic and political obstacles."71
Czechoslovakia has already made some progress in privatizing small businesses
and, though with less consensus, is turning its attention to developing a
strategy for privatization of large-scale enterprises using vouchers. 172 Hunga-
ry has established a framework for privatization by competitive bidding. In
September 1990, the Hungarian government announced an initial list of twenty
enterprises for privatization and, in December 1990, invited more volun-
teers.173
The World Bank has assisted many developing countries in the consid-
eration of privatization and actively promotes it as a useful policy option.
174
Some of the constraints and complications are similar to those faced by
Ukraine -- especially the fragile nature of democracy, the political importance
of the identity of those who acquire property, and the lack of developed
economic, legal, and institutional infrastructures for a market economy.
175
Some of these aspects are outlined below, using the experience in Chile.
This article examines five case studies of privatization from around the
world. Each is chosen for its illustration of a particular strategy of privatization
that is potentially available to Ukraine. The case studies are treated in reverse
order of importance with those most relevant to the circumstances of Ukraine
appearing last. The following order is used: New Zealand, Great Britain,
British Columbia (Canada), Chile, and Poland. Together they provide a good
170. It is important that the Ukrainian government establish reliable channels of information about
government measures. Unfortunately, communication tends to be fragmentary and ad hoc. My experience
suggests that western advisers often seem to know more about ideas and proposals in other Eastern
European nations, and even in other Soviet Republics, than do Ukrainian policymakers.
171. N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1991, at D5, col. 4 (1,000
of 8,000 businesses already have been sold).
172. Czechoslovakia: The Scenario for Privatization, 1 PARKER SCH. BULL. SOVIET & EAST EUR.
L., Oct. 1990, at 5; N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1991, at A10, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1991, at A17, col.
1; Czechoslovak Privatization:An Intermezzo, 1 PARKER SCH. BULL. SOVIET & EAST EUR. L., Jan. 1991,
at 5.
173. 1 PARKER SCH. BULL. SOVIET & EAST EUR. L., Nov. 1990, at 4; Blata, Hungary Invites Privat-
ization Bids, 2 PARKER SCH. BULL. SoVIET & EAST EUR. L., Feb. 1991, at 3.
174. Mosley, Privatisation, Policy-Based Lending and World Bank Behavior, in PRIVATISATION IN
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, supra note 161, at 125 (analyzing and disputing popular stereotypeopfWorld
Bank as engaged in privatization crusade); Nellis & Kikeri, Public Enterprise Reform: Privatizaton and
the World Bank, 17 WORLD DEV. 659, 664-71 (1989).
175. See generally Berg, The Role of Divestiture in Economic Growth, in PRIVATIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 23 (S. Hanke ed. 1987).
Vol. 16:453, 1991
Privatization in Ukraine
range of examples of privatization options. It must be remembered that these
programs were developed in the context of the particular political, economic,
and legal circumstances of each nation. Of particular relevance to Ukraine are
the objectives pursued through privatization and the potential characteristics
of a privatization program.
2. New Zealand
New Zealand's privatization program was developed in 1988 and has been
substantially implemented since then. 76 The following assets have been sold
by the government to the private sector: forty-two exotic forests for commer-
cial use, the dominant telecommunications company, an insurance company,
the largest domestic savings bank, the largest domestic lender of farm mortgag-
es, one of the largest domestic merchant banks, an international and domestic
airline, an oil and gas company, a tourism and hotel company, a partial interest
in the largest domestic steel company, a printing company, a computing
company, irrigation schemes, and a shipping company. Almost US$6 billion
have been raised so far. 77
In 1986, the New Zealand government embarked on a policy of "corpo-
ratization" - turning state trading departments into commercially-structured
enterprises with as many incentives for commercial efficiency as are consistent
with preserving government ownership. 7 This policy proved to be important
for privatization. The difficult restructuring separated state-owned enterprises
from government labor and procurement procedures and laws, and made later
sales to the private sector much easier.
New Zealand's privatization program is notable for its relatively strict
concentration on one objective -- the maximization of revenue from the sale
of assets to repay government debt. 79 New Zealand's ratio of public debt
to gross domestic product was one of the highest in the Organization for Eco-
176. Much of the personal perspective in this section is influenced by my experience in implementing
privatization, as an Investigating Officer in the New Zealand Treasury. Nothing herein is to be taken to
represent the views of the New Zealand Treasury. See also Williams, The Political Economy of Privatza-
tion, in THE FOuRTH LABOUR GOvERNmENT: PoLmcs AND POLIcY IN NEW ZEALAND 140 (M. Holland
& J. Boston eds. 1990) (economic and political critique of privatization in New Zealand). For a legal
perspective, see M. TAGGART, CORPORATISATION, PRIVATISATION AND PUBLIC LAW (Legal Research
Foundation Publication No. 31, 1990).
177. The New Zealand Treasury forecasts that over NZ$9.5 billion will be raised by June 30, 1991.
THE TREASURY, supra note 158, at 67.
178. Palmer, supra note 158, at 171.
179. The government has also cited other complementary reasons why privatization is important: 1)
for government management reasons - ministers are not good owners of businesses; 2) to avoid the
potential for future calls from the businesses for government cash; 3) to minimize the government's risk
exposure in the business sector of the economy; and 4) to enable ministers to concentrate on matters of
economic and social policy. HON. R.O. DOUGLAS, BUDGET 1988, PT. II, annex 4, at 35 (1988).
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nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD).5 0 The nature of New Zea-
land's privatization program has reflected its objectives. Each enterprise was
analyzed separately, and most sales involved the issuance and transfer of shares
in a corporatized enterprise.' In general, the sales process has consisted
of the following elements:
1) A governmental regulatory review of the market in which the business
operates with the objective of ensuring that the market is competitive
before any privatization is implemented, even if this results in reduced
revenue from the sale;
2) A governmental scoping study (often assisted by a competitively chosen
private investment bank consultant) of the nature, structure, prospects,
and value of the business feasibility of sale, and of the optimal sales
process for each business. This study included an analysis of legal
impediments to sale and those areas where new legislation is needed;
and
3) Management of the competitive sales process itself, usually by way of
a competitively negotiated tender process. This process usually involves
the following steps. First, a sale is announced and commercial advisors
to the government are appointed. Second, expressions of interest are
invited and potential buyers are given information about the business
in an information memorandum and through a due diligence process.
Lastly, would-be buyers competitively offer secret bids to the govern-
ment consistent with the government's terms and conditions of
sale.' There have generally been few, if any, restrictions on foreign
bids, other than the minimal legal restrictions that ordinarily apply to
the sale and purchase of businesses or assets in New Zealand.
The process of implementing New Zealand's privatization program in-
volved more technical, legal, and political difficulties than were originally
expected. It generated domestic political controversy, culminating in a July
1990 announcement by the government that no more assets would be consid-
ered for privatization." Much of the controversy seemed to be inherent in
the process of selling assets of a democratic government in which every citizen
had an indirect interest.' However, much of the controversy focused on
180. In 1986-87, gross public debt peaked at 79% of gross domestic product. By 1990-91, it is forecast
to be reduced to 53%. One of the criteria for deciding whether to privatize a business was that the
government must receive more from sale than it would from continued ownership of the business.
181. An exception to this was the treatment of commercial forests that were sold in separate blocks
of Crown Forestry Licenses, a specially created form of property right.
182. Sometimes it has been required that the successful bidder later sell some fraction of the shares
to the public (e.g., the sale of Telecom Corporation).
183. The Minister for State-Owned Enterprises in the new government, elected in October 1990, has
since indicated by press statement that further sales are expected to proceed.





the way in which the privatization process was conducted, and on the political
desirability of the new buyer of an enterprise. Many vested interest groups,
especially existing management, can potentially lose from any single privatiza-
tion. Such groups can be expected to try to frustrate privatization or steer it
toward their own ends. The position of management reflects the ironic "para-
dox of privatization" in which efficiency benefits of privatization are expected
to come from improved management incentives, yet the consent or acquies-
cence of management is virtually essential for a successful sale.1
This tendency emphasizes the importance of carefully formulating the
process of privatization before implementing it to ensure that it serves the
interests of society as a whole. Of the lessons that the New Zealand Treasury
has learned from New Zealand's privatization program to date, most pertain
to process and include: clearly stating the objectives of sale, and then sticking
to them; preparing thoroughly, and then proceeding swiftly; and making the
roles of participants in the sale process clear and distinct.186
3. Great Britain
During the last ten years, under the Thatcher government, Great Britain
carried out the world's most comprehensive privatization program. A variety
of enterprises were sold, including the following: an airline, an aerospace
company, a bank, oil companies, a gas company, airports, telecommunications
companies, car manufacturing companies, a coal company, a radioactive
materials development company, a port operating company, and a freight
company. Between 1979 and 1988, the British government received at least
UK£25 billion from privatization. 87 Ukrainians should note that despite the
comprehensive range of businesses and the enormous size of some of the
individual businesses privatized in Britain during this ten year period, these
privatized businesses accounted for only 9.2% of Britain's total output and
employed only 6.7% of Britain's total workforce. 8'
One academic commentator identified the following explicit and implicit
aims of privatization as the program evolved in Great Britain:
1) Improving efficiency by increasing competition and allowing firms
to borrow from the capital market;
2) Reducing the public sector borrowing requirement;
3) Easing problems of public sector pay determination;
185. See Kay & Thompson, Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Razionale, 96 ECON. J. 18, 18
(1986) (situation explains why potentially efficiency-improving liberalization and deconcentration policies
are used for concessions to management).
186. THE TREASURY, supra note 158, at 92.
187. Hemming & Mansoor, supra note 159, at 7.
188. D. SWAN, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION IN THE UK AND
US 320, app. (1988).
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4) Reducing government involvement in enterprise decision making;
5) Widening the ownership of economic assets;
6) Encouraging employee ownership of shares in their companies; and
7) Redistributing income and wealth.
18 9
These objectives have given Great Britain's privatization program a different,
character from New Zealand's. The combination of the two main objectives -
- the reduction of debt and the widening share ownership -- has meant that
most privatizations in Britain have been in the form of sales, but at rates less
than true market value. 190 In most sales, the government invited the public
to apply for shares at a set price, 191 with some rationing system to deal with
oversubscription. In general, the undervaluations of most sales created windfall
profits for buyers, thus increasing the popularity of this activity at a financial
cost to the government. However, the initially high number of shareholders
who bought shares in a privatized business usually fell quickly as people sold
their shares on the market to obtain the resulting windfall.192
. Other methods of privatization were also used, depending on the circum-
stances of the particular business. Some sales of shares were made to the
highest bidder in a process of competitive tenders, while in other sales a
proportion of shares was reserved for employees. In fact, one commentator
identified twenty-two different methods of privatization in Great Britain,
depending on the likely political opposition that had to be dealt with in each
case,"93 This again emphasizes the importance of taking political circumstanc-
es into, account when formulating plans for privatization, and of adopting a
case-by-case approach toward each privatization.
4. British Columbia, Canada
In 1975, a new government was elected in the Canadian Province of British
Columbia. It promised to return assets, which the previous government had
189. Yarrow, supra note 159, at 327. See also J. VICKERS & G. YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 157 (1988) (changed last objective to "gaining political advantage"). It seems that
the primary objective evolved through several phases from ad hoc debt reduction, to improving efficiency,
to a political emphasis on widely dispersed shareholding. See Graham & Prosser, Privatising Nationallsed
Industries: Constitutional Issues and New Legal Techniques, 50 MOD. L. Rv. 16 (1987); see also
Buckland, The Costs and Returns of the Privatization of Nationalized Industries, 65 PuB. ADMIN. 241,243
(1987) (focusing primarily on issue of share sales).
190. J. VICKARS & G. YARROW, supra note 189, at 173-83.
191. The set price was lower than the market price by 18% on average. J. VICKERS & G. YARROW,
supra note 189, at 178.
192. For example, the number of different shareholders in British Aerospace dropped from 158,000
to 27,000 in a 10 month period. Buckland, supra note 189, at 254. However, it seems that government
measures to encourage continued shareholding can reduce such decreases. See Mayer & Meadowcroft,
Selling Public Assets: Techniques and Financial Implications, 6 FISCAL STuD. 42 (1985).




nationalized, to individual ownership. 19 4 The government encountered techni-
cal difficulties in valuing and capitalizing the enterprises, as well as political
opposition in trying to develop a sales program. It decided that the way out
of these problems was to implement the following measures. First, the govern-
ment would form a single holding company, the British Columbia Resources
Investment Corporation (BCRIC) that would own a variety of other, resource-
based companies previously owned by the government (forestry, oil, and
natural gas companies calculated to be worth Can$150 million). Second, the
government would give away five shares in BCRIC to each citizen of British
Columbia over the age of sixteen who had applied for them over a three month
period. Concurrently, the government would allow each citizen to buy more
shares, up to 5,000 shares at six Canadian dollars per share, in BCRIC to raise
new capital for the company.
British Columbians were enthusiastic about the stock share issue and the
option to buy. For five free shares, 1.7 million applications were received,
representing eighty-seven percent of eligible citizens.'95 Nearly 170,000 peo-
ple bought eighty-one million new shares, which raised Can$487.5 million for
BCRIC - the third largest common stock issue in North American financial
history at the time. 196 Interest in buying shares continued after the issue
closed, when the shares became tradeable on the stock exchange. After three
weeks of fluctuating around the price of U.S.$6, the share price rose to over
U.S.$9 per share, until it eventually followed a general downward trend in the
stock market. 97 Share ownership in BCRIC has subsequently spread across
Canada and across institutional investors; 19 it appears that the success of the
privatization of BCRIC provided an important impetus to the privatization
program of the Thatcher government in Britain. 19
One commentator has identified important lessons about administering a
giveaway.e°7 Primarily, they are the need to educate citizens about the pro-
gram as well as to plan efficient administrative procedures that are flexible
enough to accommodate change. This analysis also suggests that it would be
194. Ohashi, Privatization in Practice: The Story of the British Columbia Resources Investment
Corporation, in PRIVATIZATION: THEORY & PRACTICE - DISTRIBUTING SHARES IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
ENTERPRISES 3-73 (T. Ohashi & T. Roth eds. 1980) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE]
(providing the basis for this section of the article). See also Ohashi, Privatization: The Case of British
Columbia, in PRIVATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 175, at 101.
195. Almost 5,000 people applied for the maximum number of shares. Ohashi, Privatization in
Practice: The Story of the British Columbia Resources Investment Corporation, in PRIVATIZATION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE supra note 94, at,40.
196. Id.
197. Ohashi, Privatization: The Case of British Columbia, in PRIVATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
supra note 175, at 192 (by 1986 the shares were worth US$2 each).
198. Id. at 193.
199. Walker, Preface, in PRIVATIZATION: TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES ix (M. Walker ed. 1988).
200. Ohashi, Privatization in Practice: The Story of the British Columbia Resources Investment
Corporation, in PRIVATIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE supra note 194, at 41-42.
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easier to separate the giveaway from the sale. Ukrainians should note that this
privatization occurred in a market economy where active capital markets and
a stock exchange were already established, as was true in New Zealand and
Great Britain.
5. Chile
Since 1973, Chile has implemented the most extensive program of privat-
ization of any developing country, reducing the number of publicly-owned
enterprises from 507 to 35 by the end of 1986.201 The conditions under
which privatization took place are similar to those currently found in Ukraine.
By the mid-1970s, Chile's economy was overwhelmingly dominated by the
government.2' It suffered from a lack of capital and a lack of confi-
dence.2 °3 It was severely shaken by political turmoil and faced tremendous
structural changes due to the pursuit of stabilization and liberalization policies
by the newly-installed military dictatorship. Capital markets, already underde-
veloped, were deregulated. Four phases of privatization can be identified2"
in which a variety of enterprises were privatized throughout the Chilean
economy.2 5 Each phase had different characteristics, but it is important to
note that they were undertaken during a period of military dictatorship, when
the government could suppress political tensions to some extent.
The first phase, from 1974-75, involved the privatization of 259 enterpris-
es, usually free of charge, to the original owners from whom they had been
expropriated. 6 In the second phase, from 1975-79, 110 enterprises that had
previously been purchased by the government were privatized by sale, raising
US$802 million, allegedly less than their true market value. 2°7 The sales
process first involved the public auction of shares and assets, then direct
negotiation over attractive offers between the bidder and the Corporaci6n de
201. Marshall & Montt, Privatisation in Chile, in PRIVATISATION IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
supra note 161, at 281.
202. Yotopoulos, The (Rip)7lde of Privatization: Lessons from Chile, 17 WORLD DEV. 683, 684-85
(1989).
203. Marshall & Montt, Privatisation in Chile, in PRIVATISATION IN LEss DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
supra note 161, at 285.
204. Id. See also H. NANKAI, 2 TECHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:
SELECTED COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 17-45 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 89, 1988).
205. These included enterprises in the following sectors: agriculture and agro-industry, forestry,
fisheries, mining, textiles, chemicals, electronics, metallurgy, automobile, construction, energy and gas,
services, and others. Marshall & Montt, Privatisation in Chile, in PRIVATISATION IN LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES, supra note 161, at 286.
206. Id. at 285-87.
207. Id. at 287-94. See also Yotopoulos, supra note 202, at 693-95 (showing that the sale price is,
on average 60% of the book value of the enterprise, and noting several circumstances that may imply the
market value of enterprises was not captured by the government). Book value does not necessarily bear
much relation to the maximized sales value of an enterprise.
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Fomento de la Producci6n de Chile (CORFO).205 Most of these enterprises
were sold to domestic companies that often financed the purchase through debt,
borrowing from CORFO itself. However, seventy percent of the privatized
companies (especially the banks) found it difficult to cope with the newly
liberalized market environment. By 1983, many had gone bankrupt, had been
liquidated, or had to be taken over by the government.2"
The third phase, from 1985-86, was one of reprivatization. Its two primary
aims were to diffuse ownership and to assure adequate capitalization of the
enterprises, thereby distinguishing it from the second phase.2"' Most privati-
zations during this phase were conducted through sales to private inves-
tors, 21' but shares in two large banks and in portions of two pension funds
were sold in small packages to 50,000 small investors. This goal was also that
of the fourth phase of privatization from 1986-88,212 and was similar to that
in Britain. In addition, CORFO extended loans to investors and, during the
fourth phase, sold shares to pension funds and workers. There were restrictions
imposed during the fourth phase on the concentrations of ownership and on
the incentives for diffusion of ownership. 213 It is difficult to assess public
perceptions of the legitimacy of these distribution schemes. Although diffused
ownership seems to be a fair objective, acquisition of control by managers and
workers who are associated with the military regime has raised questions about
the legitimacy of its achievements. There are now indications that the newly-
democratized government of Chile is planning to maintain, and perhaps even
to extend, privatization.
The example of Chile, especially during the second phase of privatization,
illustrates two lessons. 2"4 First, there are severe dangers in proceeding simul-
taneously with liberalization and privatization, particularly where there is heavy
reliance on uncontrolled debt financing and little scrutiny of concentration of
ownership. Second, large-scale privatization by sale can place heavy pressures
on underdeveloped capital markets.
208. CORFO is the Chilean state development and holding company, the council ofwhich is dominated
by government ministers. See C. VUYLSTEKE, supra note 167, at 83-84.
209. Marshall & Montt, Privatisation in Chile, in PRIVATISATION IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
supra note 161, at 291-92.
210. The third and fourth phases were undertaken in the context of a new regulatory regime governing
financial institutions and concentrations of ownership. Id. at 294-98.
211. In the sales to private investors, CORFO scrutinized the bidders more closely than they had in
the second phase and provided little debt financing for the acquisitions. Id.
212. Marshall & Montt, Privaisation in Chile, in PRIVATISATION IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
supra note 161, at 298-302.
213. Legislation provided that no investor could own more than 20% of an enterprise, 50% of the
capital had to be spread among shareholders who owned no more than 10% of the shares, and at least 15%
of the equity had to be owned by 100 or more independent investors. Id. at 302.
214. Id. at 293-94, 303-05; Yotopoulos, supra note 202, at 698-99; H. NANKANI, supra note 204,
at 40-41.
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6. Poland
Poland is undertaking a task of transformation to a market economy similar
to that contemplated in Ukraine. Poland has adopted a "big bang" or "shock
therapy" approach, one of the most radical approaches in Eastern Europe to
achieve the desired .transformation.2"' Preliminary results indicate success
in improving the efficiency of production and distribution in some sectors. In
the small-scale sector, especially in the area of retail consumer goods, market
incentives have become more important and have induced new efficiencies.
The same has not occurred in the giant monopolistic businesses. Inflation and
unemployment have risen sharply and growth has fallen.21 6 Three notable
features of the Polish stabilization and price-liberalization to date are large
increases in prices over wages, a demand-induced contraction, and a larger
decrease in sales than employment.217 As can be expected, social tension and
political volatility have accompanied this fundamental change in economic
arrangements.
Privatization is a key part of Poland's economic transformation as over
90% of Poland's industrial assets are in the state sector,2 8 and there are at
least 7,800 candidates for privatization.2 9 On July 13, 1990, Poland adopted
the State Enterprise Privatization Act 2 and the Office of the Minister for
Ownership Transformation Act. This legislation provides the framework and
machinery for undertaking a variety of potential privatization strategies with
respect to the shares or assets of state enterprises, by gift or sale, as well as
the formation of 'a stock market. The main strategies of privatization are
approved by the lower house of Parliament (Sejm) each year. Apparently, this
legislation envisages two main methods of privatization. One method involves
the liquidation of a state enterprise, which can be undertaken by the "parent
body" of a state enterprise in order to sell its assets, transfer its assets to a
corporation, or lease its assets to a new company formed by the employees.
215. Beksiak & Winiecki, A Comparative Analysis of Our Programme and the Polish Government's
Programme, in THE POLISH TRANSFORMATION: PROGRAMME AND PROGRESS 9 (1990).
216. Prices rose 79% between December 1989 and January 1990, and at 5% per month in February
and March 1990. Blanchard & Layard, Economic Change in Poland, in THE POLISH TRANSFORMATION:
PROGRAMME AND PROGRESS, supra note 215, at 67. Unemployment increased five-fold between January
and March 1990. Lipton & Sachs, Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland,
in 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIVITY 75, 119-25 (1990) [hereinafter Lipton & Sachs, Creating
a Market Economy]. Gross domestic product has declined by 30% since January 1990. Ordover, Poland:
Economy in Transition, 26 Bus. ECON., Jan. 1991, at 25, 27.
217. Blanchard, Dornbusch, Krugman, Layard & Summers, Reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union (1990) [hereinafter Blanchard & Dornbusch] (forthcoming 1991 as REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE
(M.I.T. Press)).
218. Beksiak & Winiecki, A Comparative Analysis of Our Programme and the Polish Government's
Programme, in THE POLISH TRANSFORMATION: PROGRAMME AND PROGRESS, supra note 215, at 13.
219. Lipton & Sachs, Creating a Market Economy, supra note 216, at 127.
220. State Enterprise Privatization Act, July 13, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1226.
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The second method involves the transformation of state enterprises into
state-owned corporations and the sale or gift of shares in these corporations.
The Minister for Ownership Transformation is advised by the Ownership
Transformation Board, which is appointed by the Prime Minister. The Minister
for Ownership Transformation has the authority to transform an enterprise into
a state-owned corporation at the request of the employees or at the request of
the parent body. All the shares in these newly-formed corporations must be
offered to individuals within two years of their formation. The Minister of
Ownership Transformation has the authority to offer shares to the public, but
must have the approval of the Council of Ministers if they are to be offered
free of charge. Before offering shares, the Minister must order economic and
financial analysis of the business and its ownership structure to establish
whether changes are required.
The process of offering shares will be either through auctions conducted
on the basis of a publicly-announced offer, following negotiations initiated by
public invitation, or by some other method chosen at the discretion of the
Council of Ministers. In the first year of any offering, employees of the
enterprise have the right to acquire up to twenty percent of the shares at half
price." Flexibility in this process is ensured since the Council of Ministers
may permit shares to be sold in a manner different than that specified in the
Act. Furthermore, foreigners may not buy more than ten percent of a compa-
ny's shares without obtaining the approval of the Foreign Investment Agen-
cy.' Additionally, privatization coupons are to be distributed free of charge
to all resident citizens of Poland. These coupons may be used to buy an
interest in privatized enterprises in one of two ways. First, the coupons could
be used to buy shares in privatized corporations directly from the government,
or the coupons could be used as shares in mutual investment funds that may
be created to hold and sell shares in privatized corporations.' m
A pilot project involving the sale of some five to seven carefully selected
businesses on the basis of a publicly-announced offer apparently proved
unattractive to the Polish public. One explanation centers on the lack of public
confidence in Polish businesses and managers. In November 1990, the Polish
government announced a more comprehensive program of privatization,
drawing largely on Frydman's and Rapaczynski's proposals. 4 Following
221. The half-price requirement is not reflected in the Polish government's privatization strategy
announced in November 1990. See infra note 224.
222. Concern about foreign ownership is of particular concern to the Polish public. Fay, Polonia
Firms: Reaction to Foreign Investment in the Polish Press, in YEARBOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS
245, 249-56 (W. Butler ed. 1989).
223. Later in this article, the potential details of such a scheme are explained further. See infra text
accompanying notes 261-74.
224. For a description of the program, see Frydman & Rapaczynski, The Polish Government's Large
Scale Privatization Plan: A Preliminary Analysis, in 2 PARKER SCH. BULL. SoviET & EAST EuR. L., Feb.
1991, at 1 [hereinafter Frydman & Rapaczynski, The Polish Government's Plan]; R. Frydman & A.
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corporatization, 10% of the shares in the 500 largest companies will be given
to the workers, 30% will be retained by the state, 20% will be given to the
Social Security Office to capitalize the state pension fund, 10% will be given
to a number of state banks, and 30% will be transferred to citizens at large
through vouchers. The vouchers, issued in several phases, can be exchanged
for shares in any intermediary institution, which anyone can create. The
intermediaries will use the vouchers in an auction process to acquire the shares
in the underlying enterprise. They then will be given the state's thirty percent
of the shares according to some unspecified formula, which they will be
required to sell to other investors. The new owners of the underlying enter-
prises and of the intermediaries will be able to exercise the usual rights of
ownership that exist in a capitalist economy.
Despite the frustration with economic reform exhibited during the Decem-
ber 1990 presidential elections, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Balcerowicz, has
retained his position in the new government. This may indicate that the Polish
government will go ahead with the above scheme, the first stage of which is
planned to be completed by the end of 1991.
IV. DEVELOPING A SUBSTANTIVE PROGRAM
As has been emphasized throughout this article, it is for the Ukrainians
themselves to assess their particular conditions and to formulate their own
privatization policy. Part IV of the article provides an illustrative example of
the formulation of a program of privatization for Ukraine, working from my
own perceptions of Ukrainian conditions. It then considers the objectives,
assumptions, and constraints on -- and options for -- a program of privatization
in Ukraine. By drawing on my understanding of the Ukrainian context and the
theory and international experience of privatization, Part IV develops the
general shape of a program of privatization that also represents a contribution
to substantive Ukrainian debate. My development of this illustrative program
demonstrates a process by which Ukrainians could develop their own program,
reflecting their own objectives, assumptions, and constraints.
A. Objectives
Each government has its own special reasons for privatization, as illustrated
by the above case studies. A government's objectives will be primarily deter-
mined by the current political atmosphere and informed by economic and legal
analyses of the effects and feasibility of the options proposed. The nature of
Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions in Large Scale Privatizations: An Approach to Economic and Social
Transformations in Eastern Europe app. 3 [hereinafter Frydman & Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions]
(unpublished manuscript given to Yale Law School Legal Theory Workshop, Feb. 21, 1991).
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a government's objectives have a determinative effect on the shape of its
program. It is only possible to design a program, and assess its success, if its
objectives are clearly formulated and expressed. In designing a program of
privatization for Ukraine, it is therefore crucial to explicitly identify the
objectives sought.
The underlying objective of privatization in Ukraine must be to facilitate
the transformation of the Ulainian economy to a market-based economy so
as to improve the economic and social welfare of the Ukrainian people. Part
II of this article outlined both the political, economic, and legal momentum
necessary to transform the Ukrainian economy and the existing impediments
to that process. Such a transformation is desirable for a variety of reasons,
including: the conceptual attraction of market principles, the enormous concep-
tual and practical problems of trying comprehensively to plan economic activity
in a modern economy, the exigencies of the collapse of the existing economic
system, the pernicious nature of much of the established Soviet bureaucracy,
and the apparent desire of Ukrainians to enjoy the greater economic freedoms
inherent in a market economy.
Part III argued that privatization is an important element in the transforma-
tion to a market economy and provided an account of the theory of, and
international experience with, privatization.' Yet it is important not to lose
sight of the ultimate objective of both the transformation and privatization -
to improve the economic and social welfare of the people of Ukraine. This
implies that any privatization program must focus on improving the economic
and social welfare of Ukrainians, and that any program of privatization must
be tailored to the legal, economic, social, and political conditions of Ukraine.
There are five requirements that should shape a Ukrainian privatization
program. These are derived on the basis of my personal understanding of
Ukrainian social attitudes, politics, economics, and law, and on my observation
of the causes of social and political concern during privatization in other
countries. The requirements are that:
1) Government property must be distributed to people on a basis that is,
and is seen to be, fair and legitimate;
2) The government must have the means to address social problems that
arise during the economic transformation;
3) Privatization must encourage the establishment of market-oriented
behavior, institutions, and laws, and favorable popular attitudes toward
them;
4) Privatization must apply to most existing Ukrainian productive proper-
ty; and
225. The focus here, as before, is on the privatization of existing state-owned property.
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5) Privatization must proceed as quickly as is politically and technically
feasible.
The first requirement is a function of two concerns. 6 The first concern
is the inherent moral undesirability of an unfair and illegitimate distribution
of property. The second concern is the likelihood that such a distribution
would, at some future stage, cause serious social and political tension in
Ukraine that could jeopardize the entire process of economic transforma-
tion. 7 The concept of social justice was heavily cited by both Gorbachev
and Andropov throughout their campaigns against official corruption and
privileges. It has proved to have powerful, though a double-edged, political
force since then with respect to wealth and privilege, non-labor income,
concern for the poor, and class conflict." The second requirement also has
as its goal the avoidance of social and political turmoil. 9 The ideals of
socialism may affect Ukrainian perceptions of fairness and legitimacy. Ukraini-
ans may well view significant distributions of property to nomenklatura,
apparatchiki, black-marketeers, and non-Ukrainians, as unfair and socially
illegitimate. The third requirement reflects the objective of privatization -- the
facilitation of the economic transformation. The efficient management of
privatized enterprises, an important feature of a market economy, relies on all
the elements listed in item three. Managers should respond with initiative and
entrepreneurship to the institutionally and legally-based incentives for efficien-
cy 23
0
Privatization should apply to a large number of Ukrainian businesses,
ranging from large-scale industrial enterprises to small state-owned cafes, in
order to have the greatest beneficial effect. The existing situation in Ukraine,
as well as in other Eastern European nations, illustrates the difficulties of
exposing only a few elements of an economy to market forces while protecting
others through command and control mechanisms. However, it is also impor-
tant that the economic transformation should not be unduly delayed or pro-
longed. Ukrainian public patience with vacillation by the center over economic
reform has already worn thin, and the social and political impacts of adjust-
ment to the transformation are likely to increase. This sets up a complicated
political calculation over the speed of reform. An extended process could stall
226. Cf. Frydman & Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions, supra note 224, at 7 ("Privatization must
be socially acceptable").
227. See, e.g., Aven, The Distribution Mechanism and Social Justice, in PERESTROIKA AND THE
ECONOMY: NEW THINKdNG IN SOVIET ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 233.
228. Mason &Sydorenko, Perestroika, SocialJustice, and Soviet Public Opinion, 39 PROB. COMMU-
NISM 34, 35-41 (1990) (popular concern for social justice is instrumental toward higher personal standards
of living).
229. Hanson, Ownership Issues in Perestroika, in DnEmmS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM, supra
note 21, at 96.
230. Cf. Frydman & Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions, supra note 224, at 8 ("Privatization must
assure effective control over management of the privatized enterprises").
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through political and bureaucratic inertia, resulting in prolonged economic and
social disruption that could well engender a shortsighted popular conservative
reaction." On the other hand, the shock of quick, drastic measures could
also cause a political or even military reaction from the conservative establish-
ment.
B. Assumptions
This article's two most important assumptions regarding privatization in
Ukraine, which are explored further below, concern the need for a program
of privatization and the limits of its application. It is also necessary to make
some explicit assumptions about the context of privatization. Although privat-
ization in the context of transforming the Ukrainian economy to a market basis
is of main concern, it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the neces-
sary stabilization and liberalization policies that must accompany privatiza-
tion. 2 However, it is assumed that the institutional and legal elements of
a market economy, as outlined in Part llI.A, will be introduced prior to privat-
ization. These elements will probably be conceptually similar to those of
western economies, but in practice the details of such laws could differ. For
instance, it is assumed in this article that organizational law will provide for
company-like organizations that issue shares. Nevertheless, a modified version
of the existing All-Union Law on Enterprises or the union regulations on joint-
stock companies and limited liability companies may be adequate for this
purpose 3 13
Part m.B.3 set forth reasons why a program of privatization is essential
to the establishment of a market economy in Ukraine, including: 1) the extraor-
dinary difficulty of reforming the current economic apparatus so as to embody
incentives for efficiency sufficient to support the operation of a market econo-
my; 2) the delay that waiting for the evolution of a significant private enter-
prise sector would involve; and 3) the probability that privatization would
occur anyway. These factors support the formulation of a government policy
of privatization despite the political and social tension that privatization univer-
231. Blanchard & Layard, Making it Safe for Capitalism, Financial Times, July 11, 1990, at 15,
col. 5.
232. See, e.g., Blanchard & Dornbusch, supra note 217; Lipton & Sachs, Creatinga MarketEconomy,
supra note 216.
233. See Dolganov & Stepovoi, Law of Enterprises Adopted, Izvestiya, June 5, 1990, at 1-2, English
excerpts reprinted in 42 CuRRENT DIG. OF THE SoVIET PREss, July 11, 1990, at 11 (proposed enterprise
regulations). For instance, the requirement that enterprises are to perform work and deliveries for the state's
needs on a contractual basis and according to procedures defined by legislative acts, violates the freedom
of such enterprises. The union regulations on joint-stock companies and limited liability companies are
reportedly designed to facilitate transition to these forms of organization. Hanson, supra note 17; Zhagel,
ImportantAction by USSR Council ofMinisters, Izvestiya, June 21, 1990, at 2, English translation reprinted
in 42 CuRRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 1, 1990, at 21.
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sally seems to cause. As noted earlier, privatization of productive enterprises
does not necessarily imply abandoning the pursuit of social justice and a
welfare state as governmental aims through other means. It also does not mean
that a process of corporatization of state enterprises, as proposed in Poland and
in a draft Ukrainian law,z 4 should not occur as a transitional measure prior
to privatization; such a process would probably be very useful. However, a
further question must be addressed before designing a program for privatiza-
tion: is a program of privatization necessary or not?
The concept of "spontaneous privatization" or "nomenklatura capital-
ism" 5 does offer certain advantages. If privatization is necessary to econom-
ic transformation and will occur anyway, there is a temptation to let it proceed
on an ad hoc basis. Presently, there is a tendency by both the Ukrainian
government and the city government in Kiev to allow ad hoc privatization at
the initiative of apparatchiki, current managers of businesses, and apparently
even a few private takeover specialists. This ad hoc privatization is consistent
with the privatization experiences of Poland, Chile, and Hungary. It effectively
involves buying off existing managers and apparatchiks who would otherwise
have had an interest in opposing privatization. Those existing managers with
initiative and with confidence in their ability to run a business without govern-
ment controls will make the effort to advance such proposals. Consequently,
privatization will occur on a case-by-case basis, depending on the economic
and managerial circumstances of each business, and the political atmosphere
at any given moment. Because spontaneous privatization is not a program, it
does not attract the sustained glare of publicity that privatization programs
usually attract while they are being implemented.
There are, however, disadvantages to spontaneous privatization, which are
dispositive. In most cases severe conflicts of interest and potential areas for
corruption will emerge. This is already a pervasive problem throughout state
institutions in Ukraine and does not need to be encouraged. Some enterprises
could be quickly privatized, but others may have managers who do not want
privatization at all, especially given the current decrease in government control
over managers. There also is likely to be significant doubt about the compe-
tence of existing managers to operate in a market environment.2 6 Further-
more, those managers who do propose privatization will have incentives to
offer the minimum benefits to the government necessary to obtain agreement
234. Draft Law on Privatization of State-Owned Property, in Background Reading Material, supra
note 10. See supra text accompanying notes 215-24. See supra text accompanying notes 176-86 (utility
of corporatization before privatization in New Zealand).
235. Savas, TheRockyRoadfrom Socialism: Privatization andEconomicReform in Socialist Countries,
THE PRIVATIZATION REV. 14, 17 (1990).
236. See P. JOHNSON, supra note 130, at 147.
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for privatization 37 These terms may not be in the best economic interests
of Ukraine. The incentive problems of management attempts to frustrate the
process of privatization or to use it for their own benefit illustrates the "para-
dox of privatization" revealed in international experience. 8
The most important objection to spontaneous privatization is that it offends
a basic sense of fairness. It does not satisfy the requirement for actual and
apparent social and political legitimacy that is critically important in the context
of Ukraine. In both Poland and Hungary, the realization by the public that
spontaneous privatization had occurred is already provoking social tension and
a political backlash that involves demands for government confiscation. 2 9
This dynamic could also occur in Ukraine and, if it does, could jeopardize
popular support for a regime that will probably be identified with the transfor-
mation to a market economy.'
A well thought out program of privatization will deal with all government-
owned businesses on the government's terms and on a consistent basis. De-
pending on what sort of program is adopted, it may still be possible to retain
sufficient flexibility to take account of the peculiar circumstances of particular
businesses. The main political risk of the government initiating a program of
privatization, rather than allowing spontaneous privatization, is that positive
action inherently stirs up public controversy while the process is occurring.
Perhaps this could be turned to the advantage of the government by actively
encouraging debate, discussion, and therefore education about the mechanisms
of a market economy. Overall, the disadvantages of simply allowing spontane-
ous privatization appear to outweigh the advantages.
Part IV.E outlines a program of privatization of large and medium-scale
enterprises that involves gift and sale of shares to the public generally. Al-
though different principles are appropriate with respect to different kinds of
property, this article deals only with productive property. It does not deal with
agricultural property, such as kolkhoz or collective farms, which have histori-
cally enjoyed a sui generis status, or with small-scale, retail enterprises.
Dispersed public shareholding is not necessarily an appropriate form of
ownership for very small-scale businesses, collective farms, or residential
property, which require careful consideration of their own special characteris-
tics.
237. Managers in Ukraine have explained to me some ingenious plans they are pursuing to acquire
control of a large enterprise. The process of management-government bargaining over sale of an enterprise
is a bilateral monopoly bargaining situation with information asymmetries favoring the management.
238. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
239. For example, a Hungarian privatization, that occurred at what many believe was a gross
undervaluation, was stopped by the Supreme Court of Hungary. See 1 PARKER SCH. BULL. SOVIET & EAST
EUR. L., Apr. 1990, at 3.
240. Cf. Lipton & Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, in 2 BROOICNGS
PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIvrrY 239, 327-32 (1990) [hereinafter Lipton & Sachs, Privatization in Poland].
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Many small, retail businesses (e.g., family-run cafes), are currently
"owned" by a state body in Ukraine. It would substantially increase the
efficiency incentives of such owner-operators if they could own these enterpris-
es themselves and keep the profits generated. There seem to be few economic
or legal reasons to insist that these enterprises be sold rather than given to their
operators, given the administrative costs and delays associated with sale
transactions.24 Furthermore, there need be few legally or organizationally
inspired delays to interfere with disposal of such small-scale businesses. One
useful policy prescription offered to Ukrainian policymakers with respect to
this is "do what you can do now to promote change. "242 The highest priority
in Ukraine with respect to small-scale enterprises should be the quick transfer
of ownership into private hands.
However, there are equity arguments that mitigate against a straight give-
away. Windfall wealth gains by those who happen to be operating a particular
small business at a particular time are likely to cause social resentment.
Additionally, the government might believe that it would need a return for
whatever establishment costs it had incurred with respect to these businesses.
If so, the government would need to devise a simple scheme through which
small businesses could quickly be transferred to private ownership without
delay in return for some financial obligations. Czechoslovakia, for instance,
has started a process of auctioning all of its several hundred thousand state-
owned stores. 43 A draft policy paper circulating in Kiev has suggested that
a similar process be used with respect to collective and Soviet farms.2 "
Alternatively, the government could first offer to sign a standard agreement
for sale of the business in return for payment to the government of a small
percentage of the business' profits over the next five years in addition to
normal taxation. Existing operators could be given a right of first refusal of
this offer, to be exercised within a set time period. If an operator refused, the
business or assets could be sold to the highest bidder in a simple, standardized
auction process.
C. Constraints
Law and politics vitally constrain the future of economic reform in
Ukraine. Politics, as well as morality, is behind my formulation of the fairness
241. Furthermore, little revenue is likely to be gained from such sales.
242. Allison, Conference Summary, supra note 2, at 23 (Moscow and Leningrad are taking such
steps). The Project on Economic Reform in Ukraine is sponsoring an Initiative for Privatization of small
local businesses.
243. The stores are sold without their real estate and occupancy is guaranteed for two years, after
which time there will be new land owners. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1991, at A10, col. 2.
244. Committee on Economic Reform, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Conceptual Framework for the




and legitimacy requirement of privatization in Ukraine. As appears from the
outline in Part II, a fundamental issue is the political and legal capacity of
Ukraine to implement its own economic measures, such as privatization. This
is a problem that does not affect independent Eastern European nations and
which affects each Soviet Republic in different ways. Of particular relevance
to privatization is the question of security of title to property. As noted, the
existing structure of ownership of productive property vis-k-vis union, republic,
and city and local authorities, is not at all clear. This goes to the very essence
of the function of property in a market economy -- the relationship between
individual and collective rights. This constraint is dealt with in true economists'
fashion, by assuming it away and by relying on my previously expressed belief
that inter-republic relations will be resolved either politically or militarily. In
the interim, formulation of republic economic policy should not simply be put
on hold. It should, however, be noted that an essential precondition for imple-
menting privatization is that the legal status of the affected property be clarified
for the purposes of Ukrainian law.245
Particular features of the current Ukrainian economic system will cause
difficulties in the transformation to a market economy and must be taken into
account by policymakers trying to design a program of privatization. These
include: the lack of concentrated private capital, the deliberately monopolistic
existing structure of industries, the interrelationship between civilian and
military industrial.production, the lack of popular understanding of shares, the
lack of competitive markets for capital, the lack of market-oriented accounting
practices, the lack of skills or experience in financial analysis or valuation in
a market environment, the lack of skills in assessing a business or monitoring
the performance of its management in a market environment, the lack of skills
or experience in organizing or managing businesses in a market environment,
and the prevalence of conflicts of interest for most existing government
bureaucrats.2' All of these factors affect and constrain the method of privat-
ization, though many of them may be positively addressed by privatization.
D. Options
International experience illustrates that there are many different options
available for developing a program of privatization in Ukraine. It also illus-
trates the importance of taking into account the local economic, social, and
political circumstances when adopting one or more of the options, thinking of
new options, and developing a program of privatization unique to Ukraine. The
245. Blanchard & Dornbusch, supra note 217, at I-3.
246. Some of these draw on Frydman & Rapaczynski, Privatization in Poland: A New Proposal
(undated draft manuscript, on file with author). A revised version of this paper, translated into Polish,
appeared in REs PUBLICA, Sept. 1990.
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most fundamental decision to make in developing a program of privatization
is the choice between sale and gift. For each individual choice, there are two
basic options for implementation:
1) Sale at the highest price (e.g., New Zealand);
2) Sale at a government-determined set price (e.g., Great Britain);
3) Gift of shares directly (e.g., British Columbia); and
4) Gift through holding company intermediaries (e.g., Poland).
Variations of each option are illustrated in the examples of international
experience from New Zealand, Great Britain, British Columbia, Chile, and
Poland.
There are further choices available within each of these four basic options.
For instance, with respect to each option, a sale or gift could be made of all
the shares of an enterprise, or only a proportion of the shares, or of all or
some of the physical assets. With respect to options 2, 3, and 4, there are a
number of categories of people to whom the sale or gift can be made --
workers, managers, or all citizens. The variety of options raises the possibility
of adopting a mixture of approaches in an overall program of privatization.
The first three basic options are reasonably easy to understand. In the course
of the analysis below, I further explain the last option, gift through intermedi-
aries.
E. Analysis
In summary, the basic choice in designing a program of privatization for
Ukraine, that between sale and gift, is best resolved by a mixture of approach-
es. The hybrid approach advocated here combines a gift of a proportion of
shares in all enterprises to every citizen through intermediary mutual funds,
and the sale of a proportion of shares in all enterprises at a set price. 247
1. Not by Distribution to Workers
One must first address a frequent, instinctive Soviet tendency to advocate
privatization of state enterprises to their workers. The tendency is primarily
politically and ideologically motivated, and is implicit in the Soviet leadership's
criticisms of existing state enterprises for alienating workers.24 Indeed, some
degree of worker ownership may well ease Ukrainian labor relations during
a traumatic period for workers. It is logical that an ownership interest can
improve both managers' and workers' economic incentives to work, and may
247. This is a mixture of options 2 and 4.
248. See Hanson, OwnershipIssues in Perestroika, in DILEMMAS oF SoviT EcoNoMIC REFORMsupra
note 21, at 74. See also Lipton & Sachs, Pivatization in Poland, supra note 240, at 308-13 (politics and




reduce agency costs by internalizing the effects of opportunistic behavior at
the firm's expense.249 This is most likely to occur with small businesses in
which an individual's effort determines the performance of the business. For
this reason, this article advocates the privatization of small businesses to
existing operators. In western economies, however, worker ownership has only
proved efficient in certain types of businesses, such as lawyers' partner-
ships." Internationally, privatization through worker ownership is usually
pursued on a case-by-case basis, and often occurs where an enterprise is in
substantial financial difficulty and liquidation is the main alternative."
Some commentators argue that workers have short time horizons with
respect to business decisions. They will pursue their own interests in terms of,
for example, wages and job security at the expense of the longer term financial
health of the business. 2 This may not necessarily be true. A worker may
expect to work in a business for a long period of time. However, the age
profile of employees will affect the coincidence of worker and firm incentives,
especially regarding labor hiring policies. A better argument from the workers'
perspective is that ownership of the firm in which the worker is employed
involves a high concentration of risk in that firm. 3 Another argument
against distribution to workers is that in larger firms that employ workers with
diverse interests, such as administrative clerks, factory workers, and managers,
there are high costs associated with collective decision-making by workers. 4
Where collective action problems exist, they inhibit the efficiency of worker
ownership. It is unlikely that the Ukrainian government will be able to identify
the potential for such problems on its own. These factors, therefore, militate
against wholesale policies of noncompetitive disposal of medium and large-
scale enterprises to workers alone.
The most important argument against an overall program of privatization
only to workers is the unequal income distribution that would result. Across
society, individuals would receive shares of very unequal worth, depending
on the enterprise in which they worked or whether they worked in an enter-
prise at all. The results of such a pattern of distribution in Ukraine would be
seen, at least eventually, as socially illegitimate by society at large. However,
Ukrainians might decide that the special relationship between workers and their
enterprises deserves some recognition in a Ukrainian privatization program.
249. Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOP, Law Firms, Codetermination, and
Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1770 (1990); seealso Wright, Thompson, & Robbie, Privatisa-
tion Via Management and EmployeeBuyouts: Analysis and UKExperience, 60 ANNALS PUB. COOPERATIVE
ECON. No. 4 at 399 (1989) (especially where there is debt financing of the buy-out).
250. Hansmann, supra note 249, at 1770.
251. C. VUYLSTEKE, supra note 167, at 29-34.
252. See, e.g., Frydman & Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions, supra note 224, at 19-20.
253. See, e.g., Lipton & Sachs, Privatization in Poland, supra note 240, at 311.
254. Hansmann, supra note 249, at 1779-96.
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It may also be useful to ease labor relations and to provide a new incentive
for worker productivity. 55 It is not difficult to provide for a small proportion
of shares in enterprises to be available to workers, either through sale or
distribution. Similarly, once shares are tradeable after initial privatization,
workers of a financially-troubled firm would be free to make a buy-out offer
to the new owners.
2. Not by Sale Alone
Disposal of Ukrainian businesses by sale alone also involves important
problems. First, the lack of concentrated private Ukrainian capital severely
limits the domestic market for such businesses, and it seems politically unlikely
that either foreign capital or identifiable black marketeers would be allowed
to act as the primary purchasers. A paucity of demand in a thin market would
be likely to produce "low" prices relative to an efficient market valuation. This
in turn would create accusations of government incompetence and corruption
and exploitation by buyers, charges that have recently been politically unwel-
come in Eastern European countries. As shown in Chile, it is also likely to
put undue pressure on the availability of capital for the potentially more
important objective of establishing new businesses.
Second, the time and resources necessary for ordinary individual Ukraini-
ans to inform themselves adequately of the relative merits of buying shares in
any of the thousands of individual businesses are prohibitive. This also would
mean that initial purchases of shares from the state would be seen as unequal
and probably unfair. Third, in any case, the lack of an established free com-
mercial environment makes valuation of businesses on a market basis very
difficult, both for the government and for all potential purchasers. 26 Fourth,
even given time and full information, there is little Ukrainian expertise in
assessing the value of a business in order to buy shares. The existing managers
of businesses, the apparatchiki in government, and the wealthy black marke-
teers would have a competitive advantage in buying shares at rates that most
likely would be seen as unfair and illegitimate. 7
A New Zealand-style privatization program based on case-by-case compet-
itive sales at market value could only be feasible with respect to the few largest
enterprises. Even then, it would probably face major problems with respect
to the lack of available concentrated domestic capital, a lack of investor
255. See Grout, Employee Share Ownership and Privatisation: Some Theoretical Issues, 98 ECON.
J. 97 (Supp. 1987).
256. For an excellent discussion of these problems, see Frydman & Rapacyznski, Markets and
Institutions, supra note 224, at 10-14, 38 app. 1.




interest, and a possible political backlash, as in Poland."8 The approaches
to sale in Great Britain, which were more oriented toward the individual
citizen, would deal better with the first problem. However, the general lack
of markets for valuation purposes, of financial information and of skills in the
evaluation of investments, would probably still inhibit the participation of most
citizens, depress share prices, and encourage inequalities in initial capital
acquisition that would be perceived as unfair and illegitimate. Unless a strong
market environment has already been created, initial share prices are unlikely
to reflect true free market conditions.
One distinguished commentator on Hungary favors the sale of businesses
with credit financing based on the belief that those who value the businesses
most highly would pay the most for them. 59 The example of the second
phase of privatization in Chile shows that debt-financed privatization with
simultaneous liberalization carries with it severe risks. Also, the assumption
that those who would pay the most for an enterprise in an initial round of
privatization value them most ignores the probability that subsequent share
trading would better achieve this, as investors begin to understand the emerg-
ing market conditions. The frequent assertion that people do not value what
they do not pay for,26° implies that Ukrainians who have lived all their lives
with artificial prices cannot distinguish between the price they pay for some-
thing and the price they can receive for it. However, this article argues that
windfall endowments of any sort of asset are unlikely to be ignored in Ukraine,
where people have become adept at making the most of what they have.
3. Gift
Given the above analysis, this article favors the initial privatization of the
shares in all medium and large enterprises by gift to all citizens equally. A gift
scheme imposes fewer valuation problems on the initial distribution, but leaves
them to be worked out by those who choose to transact on the established stock
market. Given the number of enterprises that would be given away, it would
be impractical to give a share in each enterprise directly to each citizen, as
occurred in British Columbia. Too much time and effort would be required
of each citizen in their decision as to whether and when to sell their shares or
258. There are reports that the USSR Council of Ministers envisages case-by-case privatizationof large
enterprises, such as the Kama Automotive Plant Production Association. See Zhagel, Important Action by
USSR Council of Ministers, Izvestiya, June 29, 1990, at 4, English summary reprinted in 42 CUR
DIa. SovIET PRESs, Aug. 1, 1990, at 21. However, it is not clear that true independence is envisaged for
each enterprise. See 1 PARKER SCH. BULL. SOVIET & EAST EuR. L., Nov. 1990, at 12.
259. J. KoRNMi, supra note 136, at 80-86. See also Feige, supra note 86 (proposed privatization that
uses cheap credit in some of its elements).
260. See, e.g., State Property Denationalization, in Background Reading Material, supra note 10, at
9 (last document in material).
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to buy more.26' Furthermore, the dispersed nature of shareholding would
inhibit the monitoring of management by shareholders.
262
Gift through intermediaries as a mechanism for privatization in Eastern
Europe has been discussed in many variations by several sources, including
the Polish government. 263 This mechanism responds to some of the particular
circumstances faced by privatization programs in Eastern Europe: the existence
of thousands of government businesses, the lack of any widespread experience
at trading shares or monitoring management, and the political and moral
requirements of fairness in the distribution of shares. This method of privatiza-
tion is a prime candidate for use in some form in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
26
In essence, the concept is to give shares in all underlying productive
companies equally to each citizen. This is done through the formation of
several intermediaries, such as mutual funds, each of which holds shares in
the underlying companies to be privatized. The shares in the mutual funds are
then given equally to each citizen.265 For example, each citizen of Ukraine
would receive an equal number of shares in each mutual fund.266 Because
the mutual funds would own the shares in the underlying companies, all
citizens would receive equal interests in the privatized companies. They would
be able keep their shares in mutual funds and receive dividends from the
profits of the funds or sell their shares on the stock market.
As demonstrated in British Columbia, and as understood by Rukh,267 an
educational campaign would be necessary to ensure general understanding of
these options. In Ukraine, the educational campaign would have to be very
comprehensive because of the lack of popular understanding of basic institu-
tions of capitalism. The campaign would have to confront popular prejudices
against capital and profit, reinforced by seventy years of communist rhetoric.
Yet the consideration of popular attitudes to such concepts in Part II.A illus-
trates some basis for hope that such a campaign would be successful, especially
261. Blanchard & Dornbusch, supra note 217, at 11-9 to 11-10.
262. Frydman & Rapacyznski, Markets and Institutions, supra note 224, at 22.
263. For the three best academic discussions of privatization through intermediaries, see Blanchard
& Dornbusch, supra note 217; Frydman & Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions, supra note 224; and
Lipton & Sachs, Privaization in Poland, supra note 240. The ideas discussed in each of these studies differ
in major respects, but all advocate the use of holding companies, investment trusts, or investment funds
in some form. The concepts presented in this section represent my amalgam of such ideas. See also
Memorandum from Joseph C. Bell to V. Pylypchuk, Chief, Commission for Economic Reform, Presidium
Supreme Soviet, Uk. SSR (Oct. 10, 1990), reprinted in Background Reading Material, supra note 10;
Blanchard & Layard, supra note 231; MENDELSON, PRIVATIZiNG EASTERN EUROPE (University of
Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 97, 1990).
264. See S. FISCHER & A. GELE, supra note 8, at 26; Hanson, supra note 57, at 106 (USSR State
Property Fund envisaged to be body in charge of privatization rather than vehicle for it).
265. Cf. Feige, supra note 86, at 26 (analogous idea of a "citizen share*).
266. Rukh believes that the identification of Ukrainian citizens should not be a problem, once a draft
law on citizenship is passed.
267. Savchenko, supra note 85, at 10.
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if it were expressed in terms of returning the people's property to the people
in a socially legitimate manner. The gift of shares in mutual funds would
provide an important educational experience to the Ukrainian public in generat-
ing interest and disseminating information. Everyone would have a stake in
the success of the economic transformation, as well as in the increase in
wealth.26 People would probably debate the concepts and mechanics of the
distribution and the subsequent operation of a stock exchange and become more
familiar with these institutions of a market economy.
The mutual funds would act as institutional investors.269 They would trade
shares in the underlying companies and monitor the managers of the compa-
nies. They would thus form the engine of a stock market in which individual
citizens and presumably foreigners could buy and sell shares. More important-
ly, they would begin to exert the commercial monitoring pressure on manage-
ment that is necessary for business efficiency.270 This avoids the problems
of lack of monitoring that would occur with direct gifts to all citizens and the
social illegitimacy that would occur from sale to the highest bidder. The profits
of a mutual fund would come from the dividends of all the underlying compa-
nies in which it owns shares and the profits it makes from buying and selling
shares. The performance of a mutual fund would be reflected in the perfor-
mance of its own share price, which should rise if the mutual fund does well.
Mutual funds provide an effective way of giving an equal interest in all
enterprises to each citizen without overwhelming them with shares in thousands
of individual companies or forcing them to guess the value of businesses. It
seems to satisfy the requirement of fairness and legitimate distribution,271
and could be politically attractive in Ukraine not only for its equality but also
for its positive conferral of wealth on all citizens. This could aid the political
reputation of a government's economic reform efforts. Such a scheme could
also enhance the efficiency of the stock market by establishing professional
investment institutions. It would address the need for the quick development
of markets for equity financing, while providing the opportunity for a relatively
unhurried and considered restructuring of individual businesses and organiza-
tions. 272
268. Feige, supra note 86, at 32.
269. Institutional investors - such as mutual funds, pension funds, banking and insurance companies -
- constitute a highly and increasingly significant proportion of shareholders in western economies. Jensen,
Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HAIRV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61 (institutional ownership is
more efficient than ownership by individuals and will become predominant in western economies).
270. Frydman & Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions, supra note 224, at 6 ("[E]fficient control over
management performance. . . is, in turn, the essence of the genuine restructuring process"); Lipton &
Sachs, Privatization in Poland, supra note 240, at 313 (importance of effective corporate governance).
271. Privatization by lottery may also satisfy such aims. See Savchenko, supra note 85, at 11.
272. Blanchard& Dornbusch, supra note217, atlI-2, II-lI to 11-21 (achievement of this dual objective
is important and a convincing reason for proceeding with privatization by gift through intermediaries).
Lipton & Sachs, Privatization in Poland, supra note 240, at 315. But see Beksiak, Gruszecki, Jedraszczyk,
&Winiecki, Outline ofa ProgrammeforStabilisation and Systemic Changes, in THE POLISHTRANSFORMA-
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The above considerations warrant founding a program of privatization on
the gift of shares to all citizens through intermediaries. The major problem
with such a program lies in the institutional structure of the mutual funds.
There is a danger that a mutual fund will act like, and be staffed by the person-
nel of, the various organs of the state that used to control these enterprises.
However, to the extent that an efficient stock market emerges, there will exist
an independent, objective commercial assessment of the performance of mutual
funds. Related to this, the performance contracts of the managers of mutual
funds will require careful structuring to ensure that they face appropriate incen-
tives for efficient behavior. There must also be a conscious effort to insulate
the operational management of funds as much as possible from political
interference. Lastly, the corporatization experience in New Zealand demon-
strates that a change of organizational form and corporate culture does matter.
This could be encouraged through careful and professional establishment of
mutual funds, with special provisions for foreign advisers, along with simulta-
neous restructuring of the organizational form of businesses.
The proposals of Frydman and Rapaczynski and the Polish government's
plan both address the problem of incentives for intermediary managers by,
ingeniously, turning the creation of the intermediaries over to the market.' 7
Certainly, the ability of anyone who so wishes to form a mutual fund and to
use citizen vouchers to bid for assets has conceptual attraction. Those who
want to run a business based on monitoring the management of a variety of
other companies can do so. Those who do not want to be involved in monitor-
ing the management need not be; they can pay a management fee to someone
who does.
On the other hand, competition between intermediaries creates information-
al problems for citizens in choosing between intermediaries of different skills
and competence. Furthermore, there is no necessary relationship between the
competitively determined level of the management fee and its political accept-
ability. If the competitively determined equilibrium management fee effectively
involves a twenty percent profit share going to the financial institution, there
may well be a popular feeling of exploitation. This will be exacerbated if, as
is likely, those best able to form competitive intermediaries are the apparat-
chiki, black marketeers, and foreigners. Once the principle is accepted that
intermediaries are to compete for the initial distribution of shares, it becomes
very difficult to maintain equality of distribution across the citizenry.
The above considerations illustrate the nature of the tradeoff in deciding
how mutual funds or other intermediaries are to be created and operated. If
the government decides, then there are incentive and efficiency problems. If
TION: PROGRAMME AND PROGRSS, supra note 215, at 19, 47 (rejected "fiction" of speed of institutional
ownership).
273. Frydman & Rapaczynski, The Polish Govenment's Plan, supra note 224, at 1-2.
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the market decides, there are political problems regarding perceived fairness.
These problems are at the core of privatization. The problems illustrate the
nature of the use of intermediaries for privatization. Intermediaries do not
change the fundamental nature of the issues or options, but they do ameliorate
some of the problems.
Finally, it appears from the above that it would be especially important to
facilitate the emergence of a Ukrainian stock market if privatization through
intermediaries were to be pursued. Yet the formation of several intermediaries
that hold all the shares of all the underlying businesses might only lead to a
thin market. Mutual funds could be subjected to legal requirements to sell a
proportion of their holdings over a period of several years - thus achieving
wider share ownership and a thicker, more efficient market. However, the
aims of trading, monitoring, and selling down could create conflicting incen-
tives that lead to neither being satisfactorily achieved.274 As a result, it could
be difficult to design an organizational structure and laws that adequately
reconcile the two.
4. Part Sale, Part Gift
There are two other significant problems with privatization by gift alone.
First, although using intermediaries makes large scale privatization of owner-
ship possible, it does little to encourage individual ownership of shares in the
underlying companies.27 Poland has responded to this problem with ideas
to combine such a program with distribution of proportions of shares in
enterprises to workers, banks, other financial institutions, and local authorities.
Second, privatization by gift alone does not contribute substantially to one of
the requirements identified above, that the government has the means to deal
with social problems of transition to a market economy. This can be taken into
account to some extent by altering the terms of distribution of mutual fund
shares. They could be distributed, for example, on the basis of some measure
of need. Alternatively, a proportion could be reserved for future distributions
to specific target groups.
Despite my rejection of privatization by public sale alone, partial use of
the sale option does have its advantages. It offers the possibility of creating
the means to address social concerns, encourages direct individual ownership
of shares in the underlying companies, and does something to address the ruble
274. See Blanchard & Dornbusch, supra note 217, at 11-12; Frydman & Rapaczynski, The Polish
Government's Plan, supra note 224, at 1-2 (problem in the Polish Government plan).
275. Beksiak & Winiecki, A Comparative Analysis of Our Programme and the Polish Government's
Programme, in T-E POLIsH TRANSFORMATION: PROGRAMME AND PROGRESS, supra note 215, at 9
(recommending against using intermediaries for this reason).
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overhang problem to the extent that it still exists.276 Privatization could be
done in several stages. The first stage could involve privatization by gift
through mutual fund intermediaries, as discussed above. But the mutual funds
need hold only a specified majority of the shares in the underlying companies
(e.g., sixty-five percent).2' After the stock market has existed for an appro-
priate period of time (e.g., one year), with the attendant publicity and public
education campaign, the government could sell the remaining shares in the
underlying companies by using a British-style sale of shares to the public at
set prices.
Hopefully, the existence of a stock market price for these shares for a one
year period, and people's experience with owning mutual fund shares, would
reduce the general information problems of assessing share values that make
total reliance on sales difficult. This would also reduce, to some extent, the
negative perceptions of social illegitimacy of those people who profited from
their better access to knowledge.
Selling shares at a set price also may be advantageous if the stock market's
stability is sufficient to generate confidence in pricing. Such shares could, as
in Britain, be priced at a uniform discount from the expected market price to
attract buyers' interest. The sales would encouragepeople and institutions other
than mutual funds to directly own shares, while raising money for the govern-
ment. The government could devise share allocation rules to increase the
perceived fairness of the sales. Rules could include setting a maximum number
of shares an individual may buy in an enterprise or, as discussed above,
reserving a small proportion of the shares in a company for purchase by the
employees of that company. Other groups might also make political cases for
being deserving recipients.27 As long as shares are tradeable, and if the
demands of political constituencies are carefully managed, political arguments
should not cause too much concern.
F. Summary of an illustrative Program
As the above analysis indicates, there are many different economic and
political arguments bearing upon the privatization options facing Ukraine. The
appropriate conclusions rest heavily on assessments of Ukrainian social and
276. J. KORNAI, supra note 136, at 88-89 (reducing ruble overhang is important objective of
macroeconomic policy). See Ofer, supra note 58, at 143.
277. The figure of 65% was chosen on the basis of a very loose and impressionistic view of the degree
to which it would be necessary to demonstrate social legitimacy in privatization in Ukraine. This proportion
is the inverse of that suggested by Rukh. See Savchenko, supra note 85 and accompanying text.
278, In several 1989 Hungarian opinion surveys about preferred identities of recipients of state
enterprises to be privatized, of those polled: 9% favored a return to original owners, 29% favored selling
to the highest bidders, 26% favored turning it over to the workers, 33% favored retaining it as state





political attitudes. Based on my own assessments, this article has outlined a
possible program of privatization in Ukraine to illustrate how such issues might
be approached and conclusions formulated. I emphasize that it is ultimately
for Ukrainians, not western advisers, to make such political and social assess-
ments and to draw their own conclusions.
In summary, small-scale businesses and other types of productive assets
should be treated differently from large and medium-scale enterprises. Current
operators should quickly be given an option to buy small-scale retail businesses
on terms that satisfy society's sense of equity. If operators do not accept these
offers, the government should operate a simple auction of businesses and/or
assets to the highest bidder, as Czechoslovakia is currently doing.
With respect to its large and medium-scale enterprises, the Ukrainian
government should formulate and implement a positive program of privatiza-
tion, rather than allowing spontaneous privatization, as follows (figures appear
for the sake of illustration):
1) The government should give sixty-five percent of the shares in these
businesses to each citizen equally, through:
a) the transfer of sixty-five percent of the shares in the businesses to
eight mutual funds; and
b) the transfer of all the shares in the mutual funds to each individual
citizen equally.
2) After one year, if the state of the stock market allows, the government
should sell the remaining thirty-five percent of the shares in the busi-
nesses at a fixed price, with special reservations available for groups
the government decides deserve special treatment (e.g., workers).
The above outline leaves the details of this illustrative program of privatiza-
tion still to be worked out, especially for the operation of the mutual
funds.279 Consideration of the legal mechanisms necessary to implement the
program highlight the important policy issues, including: how to encourage
share trading on a stock exchange, how to encourage individuals and enterpris-
es other than mutual funds to own shares, what the objectives of the mutual
funds are with respect to their portfolios over time, how to encourage profes-
sional monitoring of the management of the underlying companies, how to
structure the incentives of the managers of mutual funds so that they maximize
profits, how best to structure the organizational form and capital structure of
the mutual funds, and how best to structure the relationship between the
government and the mutual funds.
279. For a more detailed consideration of these issues, see Frydman & Rapaczynski, Markets and
Institutions, supra note 224, at 24-36;,Memorandum from Joseph C. Bell of Hogan & Hartson, to V.
Pylypchuk, Chief, Commission for Economic Reform, Presidium Supreme Soviet, Uk. SSR (Oct. 10,
1990), reprinted in Background Reading Material, supra note 10; Blanchard & Dornbusch, supra note 217,
at 11-17 to 11-21.
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Further analysis of such legal and policy issues is essential to the formula-
tion of a program of privatization. It will reveal the complexity of, and the
interrelationships between, the concepts broadly discussed above.
V. THE PROCESS OF IMPLEmENTAnON
Resolution of the substantive issues of privatization is necessary, but not
sufficient, for embarking on a program. Academics intent on the elegance of
substantive ideas often ignore issues of process, 80 yet inadequate attention
to the process of implementation can destroy these processes.8 The interna-
tional experience of privatization suggests that it is just as important to think
carefully about issues of process.282 Privatization is an inherently controver-
sial issue that will generate considerable public and political debate. This will
be particularly true in Ukraine. Current changes and uncertainty in the struc-
tures and roles of government in Ukraine and the pervasive conflicts of interest
that many people in power face require a clear and early formulation of the
process of privatization. My suggestions here are more specific than in the last
section, as process is less dependent on the local circumstances of Ukraine than
is substance.
A. What?
International experience indicates that the program selected must have
clearly specified objectives,2"3 and must not underestimate the enormity of
the task of implementation. After formulation of the broad outline of the
program, a myriad of tasks still remains. For example, the following tasks
would be included in the initial implementation of a privatization program of
medium and large-scale businesses in Ukraine such as that developed
above:
214
280. While the details of actual processes used in the past are often described, there is little analysis
in the academic literature of the normative considerations relevant in formulating privatization processes
or assessments of such processes. But see Wiltshire, The British Privatisation Process: A Question of
Accountability, 45 AUST. L.J. PUB. ADMIN. 344 (1986). Process issues are much more important to ana-
lysts in, and consultants to, governments and to organizations such as the World Bank. See, e.g., Marston,
Preparingfor Privatization: A Decision-Maker's Checklist, in PRIVATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 175, at 67.
281. See Comments and Discussion, in 1 BROOINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACrvITY 309, 312 (1990)
(comments of Edward Hewett on who is going to manage privatization in Soviet Union).
282. In this section, I draw heavily on my study, observation, and experience in implementing
corporatization and privatization in New Zealand. My views should not be attributed to the New Zealand
Treasury.
283. See supra text accompanying note 186 (lessons of process in New Zealand).
284. See also C. VUYLSTEKE, supra note 167, at 23-47 (surveying general issues arising in implemen-
tation of privatization under following headings: planning and management, valuation and pricing,
determining future ownership; employment issues and employee participation, costs of privatization,
resource mobilization, and financing); Wiltshire, supra note 280, at 347-48 (four stages in British
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1) The investigation, drafting, introduction, debate, and passage of neces-
sary legislation regarding the administration of the program and the
substantive laws regarding corporations, securities, the stock exchange,
and antitrust, and of associated legal instruments such as charters of
mutual funds and performance contracts;
2) The initiation and organization of an intensive public relations cam-
paign to explain and justify the program, the operation of a stock
exchange, and the rights of individual citizens;
3) The establishment of the mutual funds, including physical offices and
equipment, initial capital structure, appointment of managers and
personnel, and the appointment of foreign advisers;
4) The distribution of shares in each mutual fund to every eligible citizen,
with explanation of operation;
5) The organizational restructuring of underlying enterprises into corpo-
rate form, with shares held by the mutual funds in light of anti-monop-
oly considerations;
6) The establishment of a stock exchange, including physical offices and
equipment, rules of membership and trading, and appointment of
personnel;
7) The commencement of stock exchange operations;
8) The initial and continuing analyses of the mutual fund of businesses in
their portfolio, the monitoring and sanctioning of the management of
each underlying business, and the commencement of trading operations;
9) The constant scrutiny of monopolistic practices by underlying firms in
dominant positions;
10) The constant evaluation of the program of privatization and
development of ideas for improvement; and
11) The constant communication between the administrators of the
program, Parliament, and the rest of the bureaucracy.
This list ignores the context of market reforms that should precede and accom-
pany such a program of privatization as well as the later arrangements for the
sale-phase of the program.
B. Who?
The most important factor in whether such tasks are competently and
efficiently undertaken is the identity and organizational structure of the group
that administers the program. This would be an important temporary task of
government requiring new skills and attitudes. Efficient management of the
privatization process); Marston, Preparingfor Privatization: A Decision-Maker's Checklist, in PRiVATIZA-
TION AND DEVELOPmENT, supra note 175.
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privatization process requires centralization, simplicity, flexibility, speed, and
transparency.8 Managers must have access to competent analytical and
informational resources. It is important to maximize the publicly perceived
political legitimacy of those who administer the privatization program. Ideally,
they should be free from any future accusations of conflicts of interests, and
they should be free from the intellectual baggage that most people carry from
the traditional system of government. This generally implies different personnel
from those who have traditionally occupied government positions and a change
in the organizational culture of the administration. 26 Those with vested inter-
ests, such as most current government administrators and managers of busi-
nesses., should not be able to subvert the process of privatization to serve their
own ends. The task of privatization in Ukraine requires the establishment of
a new body specially created for the task.287 It could be called the Commis-
sion for Privatization (or Ownership Transformation, as in Poland), and should
be accountable to the most politically legitimate existing public body (e.g., the
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet).
The appropriate lines of accountability will depend on the way in which
the relationships among the Supreme Soviet, the Commissions of the Supreme
Soviet, and the Council of Ministers develop.288 In the absence of specific
knowledge -of such institutions, it is suggested that the Chief Commissioner
and two Associate Commissioners should be members of the Supreme Soviet,
and should be elected as a unit by the Supreme Soviet. They should bear the
ultimate legal and political responsibility to the Supreme Soviet for ensuring
that the program of privatization is carried out. The allocation of responsibility
for administering the privatization program should be clear. Those people
should have legal powers sufficient to carry out the necessary functions. They
should be subject to strict rules regarding conflicts of interest and prohibited
285. C. VuYLSTEKE, supra note 167, at 80.
286. Campbell, supra note 21, at 5 (necessity of destroying current apparatus).
287. This is, implicitly, the view of Rukh in its policy and legislative proposals for establishing a Fund
of State Property of the Ukrainian SSR. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. See also C. VUYLs-
TEKE, supra note 167, at 80-90 (international examples of organization of privatization, including: a
specializedgovernment ministry, a permanent privatizationcommittee, a sectoral Ministry, ad hoc privatiza-
tion units, and other options); Beksiak & Winiecki, A Comparative Analysis of Our Programme and the
Polish Government Programme, in THE POLISH TRANSFORMATION: PROGRAMME AND PROGRESS, supra
note 215, at 51-52; Shirley, The Experience with Privatization, 25 FIN. & DEv., Sept. 1988, at 34-35.
288. For a schematic diagram of the relationship between these bodies, see 1 UKRAINIAN Bus. DIG.,
Dec. 15, 1990, at 6-7; 1 UKRAIIAN Bus. DIG., Jan. 22, 1991, at 6-8. The question of how to structure
a program of privatization to encompass the property managed by local oblasts and soviets is difficult. A
currently circulating draft lawon privatizationin Ukrainesuggests the establishmentofstate-owned property
management committees with similar structures and powers with respect to property at each level of





from holding or acquiring shares or options during the privatization pro-
cess.2"9 The Commission should be abolished when it has finished its task.
The commissioners should appoint a professional Chief Executive to
manage the privatization program. The Chief Executive should manage the
day-to-day activities of the program and should report regularly to the com-
missioners. The Commission as a whole need not be large, but its employees
should be carefully and competitively selected for full-time positions on the
basis of their skills and ability. Existing ministries must be legally, adminis-
tratively, and politically required to cooperate with the Commission in provid-
ing access to information about businesses. The Commission could also appoint
foreign or domestic financial or policy consultants on a competitive basis.
C. How?
The need to establish a Commission for Privatization in law raises the
general question of what legal instruments should be used to implement the
program of privatization. The level of generality of most Soviet law seems to
allow the general principles, processes, and timetable of a program of privat-
ization to be embodied in Ukrainian law without unduly restricting the flexibili-
ty of its administration. These enactments must include legal clarification of
exactly what the government owns and can thus privatize, and establishment
of the legal mechanisms by which to effect privatization. The process of debate
in the Ukrainian Soviet would enhance the legitimacy of the program, as would
freedom of information rules with respect to decision-making by the Commis-
sion. 290 Such legal authority would also make it more difficult to interfere
with or change the direction of the program arbitrarily or without public
debate.
As the bove list of sample tasks makes clear, it will be necessary to
delegate legally most decision-making autonomy to the Commission. The legal
powers, duties and functions, as well as the other activities of the Commission,
should be undertaken on the basis of the commissioners' authority to exercise
their legally delegated powers and to direct the activities of the Commission.
They should be circumscribed only by their responsibility to the Supreme
Soviet for the Commission's actions.
289. Draft Law on the Privatization of State-Owned Property, in Background Reading Material, supra
note 10.
290. Shirley, supra note 287, at 35. Such rules should contain carefully drawn and judicially
reviewable justifications for withholding information on the grounds of commercial confidentiality.
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D. When?
A program of privatization is itself only part of a broader program of
reform. "The transition process is a seamless web" of stabilization, liberaliza-
tion, and privatization policies."' Privatization is integral to a transformation
to a market economy and should not be delayed. However, as noted above,
it is important that certain preconditions be in place before Ukraine begins to
implement a privatization program. Questions of speed and sequencing are
among the most difficult issues, especially with regards to the relationship
between privatization and anti-monopoly policies.
292
First, it makes little sense to privatize businesses that are not free to engage
in true market activity. Ending this lack of freedom is not only a matter of
removing total administrative direction by the government, but also of encour-
aging new attitudes toward market activity. To encourage such attitudes, it is
important to guarantee and define market freedoms, as mentioned in Part I.A.
Privatized businesses must be free to buy their inputs and sell their outputs
without administrative restrictions on quantities or prices. If a government
needs to buy something, it must do so at market prices, on a willing buyer-
willing seller basis. This involves removing the formal laws and informal
norms of general bureaucratic government administration of business. It also
involves establishing a legal basis for market operations based on the laws of
contract and commercial transactions. Perhaps the most difficult task necessary
to make these laws effective is a behavioral change in the attitudes of govern-
ment bureaucrats in the direction of a western conception of the rule of law.
Second, laws regarding ownership, organization, and activities of business-
es must be in place before privatization can occur. These were discussed in
Part ll.A: laws of property, laws of contract and commercial transactions,
organizational law, bankruptcy law and banking law, securities law, laws
establishing the stock exchange, taxation laws, and labor laws. It will require
a serious and sustained effort to investigate what changes are necessary and
to formulate the new laws.
Third, and perhaps most difficult to devise and implement in Ukraine, are
the antitrust laws that protect market competition. Western economies use a
variety of legal approaches to do this: laws against anticompetitive behavior,
laws against the creation of monopolies through companies merging or being
taken over, laws that provide for government regulation of natural monopolies
such as utilities, and government ownership of natural monopolies. The
difficulty in Ukraine is that many businesses have been deliberately designed
as monopolies. Industrial associations of firms have developed that also seem
291. Lipton & Sachs, Creating a Market Economy, supra note 216, at 99.
292. See Hanson, supra note 57, at 121.
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to have anticompetitive aspects, raising the possibility that freeing prices would
not necessarily lead to competition, due to monopolistic decisions on pricing
and production.
While rules concerning anticompetitive mergers and takeovers of firms will
be necessary,2' they will not address the problem of existing monopolies.
To facilitate efficient market behavior, it would be logical to break up monopo-
listic enterprises into separate units. For example, all privatizations in New
Zealand were preceded by analysis of the competitive structure of the relevant
industry. In Ukraine, though, the problem with breakup as a solution is that
some monopolies are single factories. Where controlling monopolies by
breakup is not possible, it will be necessary either to continue government
supervision of these enterprises through a regulatory regime of privatized
companies,'to continue government ownership, or to privatize them and ignore
allocative inefficiency, monopoly profits, and social resentment in favor of the
cost efficiencies that can be expected to result from private ownership.
This is not a comprehensive solution to the problem of monopolistic
enterprises, However, it is important to have a plan for dealing with monopo-
lies before a program of privatization is implemented. The problem of monopo-
ly highlights the important question about the speed and sequencing of the
reforms that are necessary to create a market economy. Most analysis of the
transformation from a controlled economy to a market economy suggest that
two distinct stages of reform are necessary.294 The first stage involves stabili-
zation of the macro-economy (including reform of currency, monetary policy
and government spending), liberalization of the micro-economy (including
freeing prices and guaranteeing market freedoms), and the establishment of
a legal basis for the market economy. The first stage is perceived to be a
necessary precondition for the second stage, which is privatization. Some
analysts suggest, however, that monopoly problems could affect this sequenc-
ing." They suggest that the immediate breakup and privatization of the
monopolies must be undertaken at the same time as the first stage to encourage
the development of efficient market conditions. A second, more practical
reason for starting liberalization and privatization at the same time is that
privatization will take substantial time to organize both technically and politi-
cally.296 This supports the argument that issues of the timing of implementa-
293. The USSR is apparently considering draft legislation along these lines. Kroll, Introducing
Competition into the Soviet Economy: Anti-Monopoly Policy Under Perestroika, PERSPECTIVE (1990). It
is also considering retaining price controls on monopolistically produced products, in accordance with the
draft Law on Enterprises. Dolganov & Stepovoi, The Law on Enterprises: NewApproaches, Izvestiya, June
2, 1990, at I, English excerpts reprinted in 42 CURRENT DIG. SOViEr PRESS, July 11, 1990, at 10-11.
294. See generally J. KORNAI, supra note 136; Beksiak & Winiecki, A Comparative Analysis of Our
Programme and the Polish Government Programme, in THE POLISH TRANSFORMATION: PROGRAMME AND
PROGRESS, supra note 215.
295. See Kroll, supra note 293; Frydman & Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions, supra note 224.
296. Blanchard & Dornbusch, supra note 217, at II-1.
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tion should be regarded as "packaging" issues rather than "sequencing"
issues. 297
For the whole program of privatization, speed and sequencing may be the
most difficult and important issues to resolve, as shown by the example of the
second phase of privatization in Chile. They depend on the resolution of legal,
economic, and political questions.
VI. CONCLUSION
This artible contemplates the fundamental transformation of the Ukrainian
economy to a market-based system. It contemplates the implications of the
Ukrainian economy and Ukrainian law for economic transformation and vice-
versa. The political momentum toward economic transformation generated by
perestroika and glasnost is substantial, and is integrally interwoven with
Ukrainian nationalism. The impediments to economic transformation are
similarly substantial: the nationalistic conflict between Ukraine and the USSR,
the political value placed on social policies, suspicion of private business
activity, the absence of capitalist economic institutions of capitalism or an
understanding of market concepts, and the absence of experience with a
western conception of the rule of law. The problems of systemic transforma-
tion from command and control to markets are enormous in terms of law,
economics, and politics. The direction of the future evolution or revolution in
the Ukrainian economy is unclear, but Ukrainians have already made far more
progress toward economic transformation than seemed possible two years ago.
Privatization is an essential element of transformation to a market economy.
While the task is unprecedented, western economic theories can help elucidate
the theoretical concepts behind privatization, while international experience can
illuminate the practical problems of implementation. Five case studies of
privatization throughout the world have been used to characterize options for
formulating a substantive program of privatization in Ukraine. On the basis
of my own perceptions of the Ukrainian political, economic, and legal con-
texts, this article has presented an illustrative program of privatization of
medium and large-scale enterprises. It involves a combination of gift, to be
distributed equally to all Ukrainian citizens, and of later sale at a set price.
While the substantive analysis here may be useful of itself, it is more important
to acknowledge and analyze the economic, legal, and political reasoning that
might be involved in Ukrainians formulating a program themselves. Managing
the process of implementation, a topic too often ignored in academic literature,
deserves equally careful attention.
297. S. FISCHER & A. GELB, supra note 8, at 29 (suggested terminological change from traditional
economic language emphasizes inherent interrelationships between policies rather than implying that linear




Political, social, and legal factors are too often ignored in the theoretical
development of economic reform proposals. It is only with a thorough under-
standing of the Ukrainian context that a suitable program of privatization can
be developed and implemented. This is particularly important with respect to
economic transformation when democratization is occurring simultaneously.
These two participants in a three-legged race are inextricably linked, but
motivated and impelled by different forces. Surely the participants in the race
have better knowledge of their constraints and the necessity for synchronization
than western bystanders. Ukrainians understand their context. Although
western information, experience, and advice will be useful, Ukrainians should
exercise their right of "economic self-determination" to pick and choose those
aspects they wish to use. The task is immense, but Ukrainians have the
concern and determination that are necessary to succeed.

